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The formation of the League of Nations (League) was the first
attempt ever to regulate and to bind the legal relationships among
the different members of the international community. The original
thirty-two countries that agreed to be bound by the Covenant of the
League of Nations (Covenant) wanted to ensure that the League
was only a concert of independent states and not a federal union.
The League did not aim at establishing a supranational government.
The insertion of a withdrawal clause in the very first article of the
Covenant contained a manifestation that the League was not in-
tended to be an eternal association of sovereign states.
An examination of the Covenant's withdrawal clause is the sub-
ject of this article. Although the withdrawal clause was worded in an
elaborate fashion, it created many problems which at times
threatened the League's existence. In Sections II and III, the analy-
sis commences with an account of how the withdrawal clause was
drafted and continues with questions of its interpretation that were
not addressed during its drafting. As examples of how the League
functioned in different countries, Section IV deals with the secession
of Germany in 1933, and Section V deals with the subsequent with-
drawal of three Latin American countries: Honduras, Nicaragua,
and Paraguay. Sections VI and VII offer further analysis of the obli-
gations that were mandated in accordance with the withdrawal
clause at the time of secession, as well as discussion on who would
decide whether such obligations had been properly fulfilled.
Section VIII addresses the possibility of de facto withdrawal
from the League resulting from events that occurred either in the
interior of a Member State or in her association with foreign rela-
tions, such as: the Italian annexation of Ethiopia in 1936, the Italian
annexation of Albania in 1939, and the German annexation of Aus-
tria in 1938. Additional case analysis is presented in Sections IX and
X where there is an examination of both Japan's withdrawal and the
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innovative provision of Article 26(2) of the Covenant. The secession
of Japan in 1933 raises the question of whether after having with-
drawn from the League, Japan could validly continue her mandate
on certain Pacific Ocean Islands when the mandate was granted by
the League in 1926. Finally, Sections XI and XII are an overview of
why a withdrawal clause is not part of the United Nations at the
present time.
II. The Drafting of the Withdrawal Clause
The first draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations was
published on February 14th, 1919, and it was to be incorporated in-
ter alia into the Treaty of Versailles (Treaty of Peace).' The Cove-
nant was not the constitution of a super state as many argued at that
time when interpreting its title. Instead, it was a consent agreement
between sovereign states to limit their complete freedom of action in
certain areas. This limitation was designed to achieve the greater
benefit of cooperation on international problems not only for the
states concerned, but also for the world at large.
The Commission of the League of Nations drafted the Covenant
based on two assumptions: (1) that one generation could not hope to
bind its successors by written words, and (2) that the League must
continue to depend on the free consent of its component states.2 Sur-
prisingly, none of the numerous proposals prepared by the Allied
Powers for the League's Constitution included the right of the signa-
tories' states to withdraw from the League. 3 The German scheme for
a League of Nations (V6l1kerbund) of April 1919 provided in Article
1 that "the League shall be permanent," thus, it excluded any right
of secession."
When President Wilson5 brought this draft Covenant back to
the United States, fierce criticism was launched against the docu-
1. The Covenant was embodied in the following Treaties of Peace: Treaty of Versailles
(with Germany signing on June 28, 1919); Treaty of Saint-Germain (with Austria signing on
September 10, 1920); Treaty of Neuvilly (November 27, 1919); Treaty of Trianon (June 4,
1920); and Treaty of S6vres (August 10, 1920).
2. See the Commentary on the League of Nations Covenant presented to the Parliament
by the British Foreign Office in June 1919, reprinted in 14 Am. J. INT'L L. 407-18 (1920)
[hereinafter Commentary].
3. The Plenary Session of the Preliminary Peace Conference of February 1919 prepared
the proposals. See Feinberg, Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization, 1963
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 193, where reference is made to the various drafts and proposals. See
also 13 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PARIS
PEACE CONFERENCE 1919 230 (1943) [hereinafter PAPERS RELATING . . ].
4. The scheme is reprinted as Appendix III in F. POLLOCK, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(1920). The author concludes that: "... as a whole the scheme is much more formal and
elaborate than the Covenant." Id.
5. The establishment of a League of Nations was the last of President Wilson's Fourteen
Points on the basis of a new world order of January 1918. He had envisaged a general associa-
tion of nations formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees
of political independence and territorial integrity to all states regardless of their power.
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ment with regard to the omission of the right to secede. In late 1919
the United States Senate discussed the draft Covenant. Senator
Lodge, the Republican Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, pointed out the dangers that were inherent in the omission of
the right to secede. 6 He said that prior treaties that began by swear-
ing eternal friendship had been abandoned entirely.7 In modern
times, an indissoluble treaty without the right of secession was very
unusual. Although any treaty could be abrogated, violated, over-
ruled, or denounced by action of Congress, forming a treaty without
an option to withdraw was very unsatisfactory. Lodge was concerned
that peace among nations could not be promoted by forcing countries
to remain in the League if they wanted to terminate membership.
Naturally such countries would "tear everything to pieces," shatter-
ing the League and impairing in every possible way, the sanctity of
treaties to cut the bonds with the League. 8
On November 19, 1919, the Senate accepted four resolutions
proposed by the Committee on Foreign Relations. These resolutions
were to be added to the resolution of ratification of the Treaty of
Peace when it was offered for ratification. 9 One of these referred to
the right of withdrawal: "The United States reserves to itself the
unconditional right to withdraw from the League of Nations." 10 The
appropriate legal instrument for a notice of withdrawal would be a
concurrent resolution of the Congress." Republican Senators wanted
the President to have an energetic involvement in such an important
decision, therefore, they suggested an amendment which provided
that "notice of withdrawal may be given by the President or when-
ever a majority of both Houses of Congress may deem it neces-
sary." No decision was ever reached on this proposed change."
When President Wilson returned to Paris to continue discus-
sions on the draft Covenant, the Democratic Senate Leader de-
manded "some provision by which a Member State of the League
can, on proper notice, may withdraw from membership.""' President
Wilson indicated to the participants in the meeting in Paris that the
6. H. LODGE, THE SENATE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 253-54 (1925). Senator
Knox also expressed his dissatisfaction with the lack of a right of secession. See Burns, Condi-
tions of Withdrawal from the League of Nations, 29 AM. J. INT'L. L. 40 (1938). An isolation-
ist, he led the group of Republican Senators who rejected the Treaty of Versailles and who
prevented United States membership into the League.
7. H. LODGE, THE SENATE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 253-54 (1925).
8. Id.
9. These reservations were commonly known as the "Lodge Reservations." See Q.
Wright, Validity of the Proposed Reservations to the Peace Treaty, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 121
(1920).
10. H. LODGE, supra note 7, at 172.
11. Id. at 782.
12. Id. at 199.
13. See generally id.
14. See MILLER, THE DRAFTING OF THE COVENANT 277 (1928).
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United States would not accept the Covenant unless a withdrawal
provision was added. 15 Wilson believed that the majority of the Cov-
enant's drafters viewed withdrawal from the League as permissible,
even in the absence of any express provision."6 However, Lord
Cecil 17 challenged President Wilson's assumption and considered the
denunciation of the treaty to be illegal under international law unless
expressly provided for in the Covenant.' 8 As a result of considerable
pressure from many sides, the Commission on the League of Nations
introduced the following withdrawal clause:
After the expiration of ten years from the ratification of the
Treaty of Peace of which this Covenant forms a part, any State
or member of the League may, after giving one year's notice of
its intention, withdraw from the League, provided all its interna-
tional obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant
shall have been fully fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal. 19
In the opinion of some delegations, this amendment created
more problems than it solved. In particular, the French argued that
the ten year period, which had to elapse before a state was able to
exercise its withdrawal right, would have a bad psychological effect
on Member States.' 0 The ten year period could be regarded as a
trial period at the end of which the League could be easily dis-
solved.' Finally, after much deliberation on this point, the right to
secede from the League was formulated in the following words and
incorporated in the Covenant as paragraph 3 of Article 1:
Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of
its intention to so do, withdraw from the League, provided that
all its international obligations and all its obligations under the
Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its
withdrawal .2
15. See Burns, supra note 6, at 41.
16. Id.
17. At that time, Lord Cecil was in charge of the League of Nations Section at the
Foreign Office.
18. The opinion of the legal adviser of the United States Delegation to the Conference
supported by Lord Cecil's contention. The opinion was that only states under the doctrine of
changed circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) could exercise an unwritten right to withdraw
from a treaty. See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 193.
19. This was an amendment to the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) [hereinaf-
ter Covenant]. The original withdrawal clause stated in Article 1:
Any member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so
to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations
and all its obligations under this Covenant have been fulfilled at the time of its
withdrawal.
Id.
20. See Miller, supra note 14, at 342.
21. Id.
22. The right of secession was among the very first provisions of the Covenant. However,
provisions addressing withdrawal from an international organization or denunciation of a
treaty normally are dealt with in the final provisions of the relevant instruments. Under this
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Pollock, a leading British commentator of that era, expressed in
similar lines that the withdrawal clause was not very likely to be
acted upon: "If the League were to break up, it would break up in a
different fashion and so long as it holds firm one can hardly conceive
what should make it desirable for any other state to secede."23 The
Commentary of the British Foreign Office on the question of the
withdrawal clause was euphonious, but it failed to materialize:
The last paragraph [of Article 1] is an important affirma-
tion of the principle of national sovereign, while providing that
no state shall be able to withdraw simply in order to escape the
consequences of having violated its engagements. It is believed
that the concession of the right of withdrawal will, in fact, re-
move all likelihood of a wish for it, by freeing States from any
sense of restraint, and so tending to their more whole-hearted
acceptance of membership.
2 4
III. Questions Arising from the Withdrawal Clause
The language of Article 1(3) raised a number of questions. The
two most important questions were: (1) what constituted interna-
tional obligations under this Covenant, and (2) who was to deter-
mine fulfillment of these international obligations. The Commission
that drafted the Covenant failed to interpret the second part of the
withdrawal clause, and it failed to designate which League organiza-
tion would determine whether a country, expressing her intention to
withdraw, had fulfilled her League obligations. The Commission was
primarily concerned with the language of the withdrawal clause and
the period of time within which a state should be allowed to exercise
it.25
The language of the withdrawal clause requires that a state
must fulfill its obligations prior to exercising its option to withdrawal
from the League. The obligations are classified into two categories:
(1) international obligations and (2) conventional obligations in the
provision sixteen states withdrew: Costa Rica (1927); Brazil (1928); Germany and Japan
(1935); Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (1938); El Salvador, Italy, and Paraguay
(1939); Chile and Venezuela (1940); and Spain, Hungary, Peru, and Romania (1941).
Article 17(2) of the Havana Convention of Treaties also recognized the right to denounce
a treaty when the denunciating party had complied with all obligations stipulated under the
treaty in question. This right was present even though the Treaty lacked an express right of
denunciation. The Havana Convention was signed by eight South American States (all of
which were members of the League) on February 20, 1928; HUDSON'S INTERNATIONAL LEGIS-
LATION 2378 (1937) [hereinafter Havana Convention]; 22 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 138 (1928).
23. F. POLLOCK, supra note 4, at 47.
24. See Commentary, supra note 2, at 407, 408.
25. The only contribution appears to be that of the French delegation which emphasized
that withdrawal from the League should only take place on terms that would not injure the
League. See Fenwick, The Fulfilment of Obligations as a Condition of Withdrawal from the
League of Nations, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 517 (1933).
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sense of financial, fundamental, and formal obligations.26 "Funda-
mental" and "formal" obligations have yet to be distinguished since
a distinction does not serve any real purpose. Many commentators
have expressed the view that the desire to make the fulfillment of
general international obligations a condition of withdrawal from the
League as being difficult to explain,2 7 "superfluous, ' 28 and without
earnestness. 9 Other commentators placed little importance on the
fact that these obligations were not dependent upon the country's
membership in the League. These international obligations (e.g., du-
ties stemming from signing or acceding to a treaty) were not more
binding because a state was a member of the League; they were in-
ternational obligations stemming from the legal force of interna-
tional law in which even secession from the League would not impair
their legal validity. However, although the obligations had to be ob-
served and fulfilled before exercising the withdrawal clause,30 it was
almost impossible to establish at any given date whether or not a
state had fulfilled all its international obligations.31 Therefore, a lit-
eral interpretation of Article 1(3) was contrary to common sense.
3 2
No state could show at a moments notice that it had not fulfilled all
of its international obligations, no matter how well it conducted its
affairs.33
The importance of including "international obligations" in the
wording of Article 1(3) was to prevent it from becoming the perfect
vehicle for states to violate obligations under international law and
escape the consequences. Under that wording, international or re-
gional organizations could put pressure on those countries that failed
to follow their international obligations. Also, the dependency be-
tween membership in the various organizations and accession to
treaties meant that breaching obligations for one membership could
trigger rapid action in a chain of other organizations.3
26. SINGH, TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 38, et
seq. (1958).
27. Fenwick, supra note 25, at 517.
28. J. RAY, COMMENTAIRE DU PACTE DE LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS III (1930).
29. G. HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF TREATIES 246.
(1973).
30. 1 SCHOCKIND & WEHBERG: DIE SATZUNG DES VOLKERBUNDEs 373 (3rd ed. 1931).
31. G. HARASZTI, supra note 29, at 246.
32. Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 1(3).
33. G. HARASZTI, supra note 29, at 23.
34. Because of the policy of apartheid, South Africa has been subjected to restrictions
on its rights to participate in the work of international organizations (e.g., World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) in 1964, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1974, and
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1975). Furthermore, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly has constantly denied recognition of the credentials of its representatives. Also,
the various Conventions that were concluded under the aegis of the Council of Europe provide
that any party which ceases to be a member of the Council ceases to be a party to the individ-
ual Conventions which it signed. See, inter alia, European Convention of Human Rights, No-
vember 4, 1950, art. 65(3), 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of
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Unlike the present, in the period between the two World Wars,
the League of Nations was the only entity in the world community
that could exercise worldwide pressure. Although this pressure was
limited and mostly ineffective, it did influence the governments of
those Member States that chose to violate their international obliga-
tions. The inclusion of "international obligations" was the drafters'
aim at ensuring the longevity and stability of the League; however,
this never materialized. The Convention did not effectively control
and prevent negative actions undertaken by its Member States, thus,
this lead to the eventual failure of the experiment with the League.
Nonetheless, areas of effectiveness within the Covenant included
its strong advocation of the dependence of the League on interna-
tional law as well as the close relationships formed among the Mem-
ber States and the rest of the world. In fact, the Preamble of the
Covenant states that the contracting parties agree to "a scrupulous
respect of all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples
with each other. ' 3 5 There are also other parts of the Covenant which
portray the interdependence of the League. The all-embracing Arti-
cle 1(2) stipulated that any country which was not a signatory of the
Peace Treaties or was not invited to accede to the Covenant could be
admitted as a new member provided that it could guarantee its sin-
cere intention to observe its international obligations. 6 Article I 1 (1)
provided that any war or threat of war, irrespective of whether any
League member was directly affected, would be declared a matter of
concern to the League as a whole. 87 The League had to ensure that
the peace of all nations, not just peace among members of the
League, was safeguarded.38 Article 13(2) stipulated that disputes
which would constitute a breach of any international obligation
might be submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement.3 9 Article 17
referred to disputes between Member States and non-members and
held that non-members should be invited to subject themselves to the
objectives of League membership for the purpose of dispute
solving."
Even if a Member State failed to observe all the major obliga-
tions due, that country remained a member of the League and was
fully bound by the Covenant. A more forceful withdrawal clause,
which was not acceptable to the majority of Member States, would
Disputes, April 29, 1957, art. 40, 320 U.N.T.S. 243.
35. Covenant, supra note 19, at Preamble.
36. Under this provision, Austria and Germany became members in 1920 and in 1926,
respectively.
37. Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 11(1).
38. This article should be contrasted with Articles 12 and 13 which expressly referred to
disputes, including war, that might arise among Member States.
39. Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 13(2).
40. Id.
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have provided that secession could not be affected unless the state in
question had fulfilled all its duties. Such formulation would have
made clear that withdrawal from the League did not happen auto-
matically after the period of two years had expired.
By adding fulfillment of all international obligations at the time
of a state's withdrawal, the Covenant provided a sanction which the
League could use against a withdrawing member that had not ful-
filled its international duties.4 1 Observance of these obligations be-
came more difficult for Member States to evade because the Cove-
nant itself placed added emphasis on them.42 However, if the League
had used this sanction properly, results would have been two-fold.43
First, the withdrawing state would have been branded in the public
opinion of the world community as having deliberately violated its
obligations." Second, the League organs would have retained juris-
diction in regard to that state's membership even after the two years'
notice of withdrawal had elapsed." Whereas the former argument is
undisputed, legal justification was never given for the latter." If the
drafters' aim was to enable the League to retain jurisdiction, there
was nothing in the Covenant to suggest it. An express provision to
that effect was made in Article 35 of the Convention Relating to
Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Sur-
face;4  Article 35 stipulated that denunciation was possible on six
months' notice, but the Convention would continue to apply for the
purpose of calculating any damages that arose before the denuncia-
tion period had expired. 8
IV. The Withdrawal of Germany
The withdrawal of Germany is an example of a Member State
who breached her international obligations during the two year no-
tice period prior to secession.4 9 The notification of Germany's inten-
tion to leave was sent to the Secretary General of the League on




45. Id. It is difficult to see why the author characterized a single condition of withdrawal
as "sanction." Not all states withdrew from the League merely in order to escape their obliga-
tions, and it would be inappropriate to regard the fulfillment of their international duties as a
punishment for seceding from the League. Id.
46. As Fenwick correctly pointed out: "No sanction was contemplated in the event of
the withdrawal of a state without observing the conditions laid down." C. Fenwick, supra note
25, at 518.
47. Convention Relating to Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the
Surface, October 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181 (signed in Rome).
48. Convention, supra note 19, at Article 35.
49. See C. FRASER, DAS AUSTRITT DEUTSCHLANDS AUS DEM VOLKERBUND: SEINE
VORGESCHICTE UND SEINE NACHWIRKUNGEN (1969).
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October 19, 1933,0 and thus, secession would have become effective
on October 18, 1935.51 The reason given by Germany for withdraw-
ing was that the League had failed to carry out the terms of Article
8 (Disarmament) of the Covenant.52 Article 8 required all members
of the League to reduce their national armaments to the essential
minimum "consistent with national safety and the enforcement by
common action of international obligations."" They also agreed to
discourage the manufacture "of munitions and implements of war"
by private enterprises."
In fact, implementation of Article 8 was the purpose of the Dis-
armament Conference which opened in Geneva on February 2, 1932,
amid Germany's growing advocation for withdrawal from the
League. When Bruning, the head of the German delegation, ad-
dressed the Conference, his theme was to articulate Germany's legal
and moral claim to general disarmament."'
At the beginning of October 1933, the Conference was not pro-
gressing well. Having the support of President von Hindenburg,
Chancellor Hitler regarded the Conference as an excellent opportu-
nity to leave the League. Hitler knew that such action would not
face opposition in Germany and the League would not impose any
penalties. Furthermore, it was not likely that the Western powers
would agree on concerted action against him.5"
On October 14, 1933, the German government announced that
it was "compelled to leave the Disarmament Conference."57 The rea-
son Germany gave was that the Conference had failed to fulfill its
objective which was "due solely to the unwillingness on the part of
the highly armed states to carry out their contractual obligations to
disarm."58 None of the Great Powers delivered a direct protest to
50. 15 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 16 (1934).
51. The withdrawal clause required a two year notice prior to a Member State's seces-
sion. It emerged during the NUremberg Trials that Chancellor Hitler was preoccupied with
taking Germany out of the League. In a secret speech delivered to all supreme commanders on
November 23, 1939, Hitler said:
.... while organizing the interior I undertook the task to release Germany
from international ties. Two particular characteristics are' to be pointed out: se-
cession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the Disarmament Con-
ference. It was a hard decision . . . I was supported by the nation, which stood
firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for
rearmament . . . . In 1935 the introduction of compulsory military service.
See THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, Part I, 154 (1946).
52. Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 8.
53. Id.
54. On the evolution of art. 8, see A. ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE
ROLE OF LAW 326-33 (1936).
55. See KIMMICH, GERMANY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 160-62 (1976).
56. Japan had started the procedure for withdrawing from the League in March 1933.
Without encountering any problems, the reaction of the Powers to Germany's attempt to sub-
vert Austria was confined to paper protests. Id. at 186.
57. Id. at 189.
58. Id.
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Germany, nor contemplated the imposition of effective sanctions.
They preferred to remain neutral and to settle the situation individu-
ally. The Conference confined itself to refuting the allegations made
against it and declared its intention to continue deliberatioris.5 9 Only
France stood out and warned that Germany was rearming and had
no intention of observing her international obligations.
Having faced such a mild reaction, on October 17, 1933, Hitler
assured his cabinet that the "crucial period" was over. A few days
later the German consul at Geneva presented a brief note to the Sec-
retary General of the League that Germany was withdrawing. Chan-
cellor Hitler, wanting to present himself as a truly democratic
leader, put his policy (called "policy of peace") towards the League
of Nations by a referendum on November 12, 1933. The results were
overwhelming - 95 % of the population approved Germany's
secession. 0
Although Germany had initiated the procedure to withdraw
from the League, she was still bound by the Treaty of Versailles; this
posed the main obstacle to Hitler's plans. Part V of the Versailles
Treaty ordered almost total disarmament of Germany. It consisted
of four relevant provisions: (1) Article 159 provided that Germany's
military forces were to be demobilized and reduced; (2) Article 173
abolished universal compulsory military service and provided for the
constitution of a Germany army;61 (3) Article 198 prohibited the ex-
istence of military or naval air force, and Article 213 empowered the
League to exercise supervision over German armaments;"2 and (4)
Article 213 remained a dead letter and the gap created by the aboli-
tion of compulsory conscription63 was filled with non-official organi-
zations that eventually developed into private armies.
During the first months of 1935, Chancellor Hitler did every-
thing possible to admit publicly that the disarmament clauses of the
Versailles Treaty were repudiated. In pursuance of this policy, he
sent a note to the British government referring to the existence of a
German Air Force which directly contravened Article 198.64
Germany's official unilateral denunciation of Part V occurred in
March 1935, when Germany re-established the compulsory military
59. This reaction was quite pathetic. Since all delegations were well aware that without
the presence of Germany, the Conference was virtually meaningless.
60. KIMMICH, supra note 55, at 191.
61. In pursuance of this article, a law for the disarmament of the German population
was enacted on August 7, 1920.
62. See GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, 1914-1945, 68 (1987).
63. "Conscription" is the obligation that is placed on male citizens to serve a certain
period of time in the national army. It still exists in most European countries.
64. P.J.N. BAKER, TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 66 BRIT-
ISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (1935).
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service. 68 The law ordering compulsory conscription was promul-
gated on March 16, 1935, and was communicated to the Ambassa-
dors of France, Great Britain, Ireland, and Poland who were con-
vened by the Germany Foreign Minister especially for this
announcement. 6 France was most concerned with these develop-
ments, and by invoking Article 11(2) of the Covenant,67 France
presented the matter before the Council. She argued that in both
cases the German government had repudiated by a unilateral act,
the contractual engagements embodied in the treaties that it had
signed. France also drew the Council's attention to the fact that Ger-
many remained a member of the League until the withdrawal notice
had expired and that Germany had undertaken, by virtue of the
Covenant's Preamble, "to observe a scrupulous respect for all treaty
obligations in the dealings of organized people with each other."
On April 17, 1935, the Council unanimously adopted a resolu-
tion which declared that Germany had failed in the duty which lay
upon all members of the International Community to respect the un-
dertakings which they had contracted.e The Council also con-
demned any unilateral repudiation of international obligations. The
resolution concluded that such repudiation should call into play all
appropriate measures on the part of the members of the League
within the framework of the Covenant. In other words, the resolution
contained an indirect threat to impose sanctions on those states that
repudiated their obligations.
The Council watered down its reaction to Germany's actions. It
confined itself to empty words and it failed to agree on the adoption
of a resolution expressly condemning conscription in Germany be-
cause the Council feared that such a resolution would make Ger-
many's return to the League impossible. Even at this late stage,
there were still governments which strongly believed Hitler's pro-
nouncement that the "honest desire" of all Germans was to regain
membership in the League.70 Finally, the Council took the typical
action of that era - it requested that a committee be appointed to
65. Following defeat in World War I, Article 173 was regarded as the everlasting hu-
miliation. See Fenwick, The Denunciation of the Disarmament Clauses in the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1935). See also A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMI-
NATION 68 (1975).
66. The text of this law is reprinted in PAPERS RELATING . supra note 3, at 330.
67. Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 11(2). The text of this paragraph read:
It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to
bring to the attention of the Council any circumstances whatever affecting inter-
national relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good un-
derstanding between nations upon which peace depends.
Id.
68. 16 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OJ. 569 (1935).
69. The resolution of the Covenant contained an indirect threat to impose sanctions on
those states that repudiated their obligations.
70. KIMMICH, supra note 55, at 193.
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propose
. . . measures to render the Covenant more effective in the or-
ganization of collective security and to define in particular the
economic and financial measures which might be applied, should
in the future a state, whether a Member or the League of Na-
tions or not, endanger peace by the unilateral repudiation of in-
ternational obligations.
7 '
This act was not of any real importance. Apparently the committee
was never set up.
72
In a note addressed to the governments of the States repre-
sented on the Council on April 20, 1935, Germany contested these
States' right "to set themselves up as judges of Germany" and re-
jected the resolution as an attempt at a new discriimination against
her.73 Opposition to the German fait accompli also came from a spe-
cially convened conference between Britain, France, and Italy which
was held at Stresa, Italy in late April 1935. These three states
adopted the following Declaration:
The three powers, the object of whose policy is the collec-
tive maintenance of peace within the framework of the League
of Nations, find themselves in complete agreement in opposing
by all practicable means any unilateral repudiation of treaties
that may endanger the peace of Europe and will act in close and
cordial collaboration for this purpose.
7 4
The German justification for the unilateral action of March
1935 was based on the principle of reciprocity. Germany argued that
the Allied Powers were bound to her by treaty obligations to reduce
their own armaments, and her duty to continue to observe the
clauses of Part V of the Versailles Treaty was conditional upon the
fulfillment of the Allied Powers' duties. When the obligations were
not performed fifteen years following World War I, Germany's obli-
gations ceased to be binding upon her. Part V of the Versailles
Treaty, therefore, could be unilaterally denounced without the con-
sent of the other parties. 5
71. The resolution of the Council is reprinted in PAPERS RELATING . supra note 3,
at 317-18.
72. Id.
73. KIMMICH, supra note 55, at 194.
74. See A. DAVID, supra note 65, at 42. Germany was not expressly mentioned as the
state endangering the peace of Europe. Id.
75. Novembervertrag was concluded between Germany and her enemies in the early
days of November 1918. This argument was elaborated in V. BRUNS, DEUTSCHLANDS
GLEICHBERECTIGUNG ALS RECHTPROBLEM, (1934). See also Garner & Jobst, The Unilateral
Denunciation of Treaties by one Party because of Alleged Non-Performance by another Party
or Parties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 574 (1935). See generally M. Sorensen, The Modification
of Collective Treaties without the Consent of all Contracting Parties, ACTA SCANDINAVICA
JURIs GENTIUM 150 (1939).
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The situation got even more perplexing when on June 18, 1935,
the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (Agreement) was concluded. 76
This Agreement had the result of nullifying Articles 181-197 of the
Treaty of Versailles and all of Part V. 7 The paradox was that the
Agreement authorized a level of German naval armament which was
inconsistent with those provisions of the Versailles Treaty since they
remained technically in force for the other parties. By virtue of Arti-
cle 181 et. seq., Germany's naval forces were limited to six battle-
ships, thirty smaller warships, and no submarines. Under this Agree-
ment the total tonnage of the German fleet was not to exceed 35%
of the aggregate tonnage of the naval forces of the members of the
British Commonwealth of Nations. In respect to submarines, under
certain conditions, the Agreement gave her the right to possess a
tonnage equal to the total submarine tonnage of the British
Commonwealth.7"
The legal force of this Agreement vis-a-vis Germany's position
toward the Treaty of Versailles and Germany's international obliga-
tions is not very clear. According to the rules of Public International
Law, Germany did not free herself from the duties imposed by Part
V of the Versailles Treaty. Support for this submission is offered by
the Protocol signed in London on January 17, 1871, which declared
that it is "an essential principle of law of nations that no Power can
liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stip-
ulations thereof, except as the result of the consent of the con-
tracting parties, by means of an amicable understanding. 79
Article 10 of the Havana Agreement provided in similar terms
that it was not possible for a state to relieve herself of the obligations
of a treaty or modify its stipulations, except by agreement secured
through peaceful means of the other contracting parties.80 Although
the Havana Convention was not applicable to both Great Britain and
Germany, some of its provisions may be invoked in order to reach
the opposite conclusion, i.e., that the Naval Agreement had the legal
effect that Germany was not violating her international obligations
any more.8 Furthermore, Article 14 of the Havana Convention stip-
The Allied Powers' obligations were founded on the so-called Novembervertrag on the
preamble of Part V; on Article 8 of the Covenant; and on the conditions under which Germany
joined the League in 1926.
76. Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935).
77. 22 United Kingdom Treaty Series (1935). All treaties issued by the United King-
dom are issued annually.
78. See GRENVILLE, supra note 62, at 166-68. The Agreement was denounced by Ger-
many on April 27, 1939. Id.
79. See also Garner & Jobst, supra note 75, at 585. Garner and Jobst concluded that
"Germany's right to maintain naval forces in excess of those permitted by the Treaty of Ver-
sailles in effect acquiesces in the German repudiation of the naval clauses."
80. Havana Convention, supra note 22.
81. Declaration as to Non-Alteration of Treaties without Consent of Contracting Par-
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ulated that treaties ceased to be effective either by renunciation of
the party exclusively entitled to a benefit under the treaty or by the
incapability of execution.
Both of these grounds could be applicable in the present case.
The practical abolition of the German naval forces under the Ver-
sailles Treaty could be regarded as a "benefit" to Great Britain be-
cause a weak military for Germany might have led to Britain's pros-
perity. Also, Part V had become "incapable of execution," and
Article 213, which referred to supervision of the German military
forces by the Allied Powers, had failed to materialize since the other
signatory states, including Great Britain, had failed to fulfill the con-
dition of general disarmament for which the preamble of Part V
provided.
In addition, Article 18 of the Havana Convention stipulated
that "two or more States may agree that their relations are to be
governed by rules other than those established in general conventions
celebrated by them with other States." 2 The Versailles Treaty could
be regarded as a "general convention" in the sense that it regulated.
relations between Germany and the rest of Europe in the aftermath
of World War I. To a large extent, the Treaty prescribed what she
was or was not allowed to do. In order for this agreement to be sus-
tained, Britain and Germany lawfully concluded the Naval Agree-
ment, by which they consented to have the rearmament of the Ger-
man navy governed by different rules which were to apply between
them.
However, despite these agreements, Germany breached its inter-
national obligations and she continued to do so even after she had
officially seceded from the League. In fact, on March 7, 1936, Ger-
many unilaterally repudiated her obligations under Articles 42 and
43 of the Versailles Treaty with respect to demilitarization of the
Rhineland zone guaranteed by the Treaty of Locarno. a3 Under the
Locarno Treaty, Germany and France guaranteed the maintenance
of the territorial status quo in their frontiers, the inviolability of
these frontiers, and the observance of the stipulations concerning the
demilitarized Rhineland zone. They also agreed not to attack, invade
ties, 2 Hertslet Map of Europe by Treaty, at 1904. The occasion for its issuance was the
denunciation by Russia of certain provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 concerning the
demilitarization of the Black Sea. The Treaty of Paris of 1856, Russia-Turkey, 114 Parry's
T.S. 402-403.
82. Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 18.
83. Locarno Treaty, Oct. 16, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 239. This was also a "Treaty of Mutual
Assistance." The argument put forward was that the Treaty of Locarno was incompatible with
the Franco-Soviet Pact of May 2, 1935, which was described as a "Mutual Assistance Pact."
167 L.N.T.S. 395, GRENVILLE, supra note 62, at 152-54. The Pact was ratified by the French
Chamber of Deputies on February 27, 1936. Ratification by the Senate remained in suspense
but was brought about dramatically on March 12, 1936, following the dispatch of German
troops into the Rhineland.
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or resort to war with each other. The agreement was guaranteed by
both the United Kingdom and Italy. In a statement before the Coun-
cil on March 19, 1936, the German Foreign Minister, Baron Von
Ribbentrop, argued for the automatic invalidation of the Locarno
Treaty, when there had been "a showing of an open and avowed
repudiation" of it by France.84
V. The Withdrawal of Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay
The Covenant's Article 1(3) deals with fulfilling all obligations
prior to withdrawal. Proper payment of financial contributions is a
fundamental obligation because without the necessary funds, not
only the function of an international organization suffers, but also
the organization itself is crippled. The Secretary General of the
League stated: "Where a principal purpose of the agreement is to
maintain an organization out of funds contributed by the parties,
persistent failure to contribute would be a breach of a material obli-
gation."'85 The financial obligations of a Member State were based
on Article 6(5) of the Covenant, which stipulated that the Assembly
was to decide the proportion of the expenses of the League to be
borne by each member.
The relation between Article 1(3) and non-payment of financial
contributions was evaluated when the notices of withdrawal were
submitted by Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay.8 6 Honduras gave
its notice of withdrawal on August 10, 1936.87 A year earlier the
Assembly had arranged to cancel part of its debt to the League and
settle the balance in annual installments up to 1955. A very strict
condition was inserted in this agreement; if even a partial default on
an installment in the year in which it was due occurred, the arrange-
ment was to be automatically canceled and the debt was to become
due in full. The two legal questions that arose were: (1) whether
Honduras could be permitted to continue paying installments on con-
solidated contributions for seventeen years after leaving the League,
and (2) whether Honduras had to pay the full agreed amount before
her notice of withdrawal became effective on August 9, 1938, in or-
84. Fenwick strongly opposed this argument because it was "against every accepted rule
of the binding force of treaties." Fenwick, The Relation of the Franco-Soviet Pact to the
Locarno Treaty, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 265, 269 (1936). See also, Wright, The Rhineland Occu-
pation and the Enforcement of Treaties, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 486 (1936).
85. 8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., 506 (1928).
86. During the Eighteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly (1937), the Fourth (Finan-
cial) Committee asked the First (Legal) Committee a number of questions concerning the
debts of these states. The decision to submit these questioni was made on September 22, 1937.
See Meyers, Membership and Indebtedness in the League of Nations, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 148
(1938) and Effect of Non-Payment of Financial Obligations, BRIT. J. INT'L L. 218 (1938).
87. In 1922, Honduras was the first member of the League to take steps for notifying
her intention to secede. However, this notice was never effected. See Hudson, Membership in
the League of Nations, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 436, 457 (1924).
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der to comply with the requirements of the Article 1(3).
In another Member State, Nicaragua's notice of secession was
received on June 27, 1936. She had already proposed a settlement.
Her financial obligations towards the League were to be made paya-
ble by installments after her withdrawal. Her debt for not paying her
contributions for fiscal years 1920 to 1937 was to be reduced from
c.356,500 to c.41,500 gold francs. The Special Committee on Contri-
butions proposed to the Assembly an arrangement identical to that
of Honduras. 8a The legal questions in this case were: (1) whether the
Assembly was empowered to grant a reduction of debt to a country
that had notified the Assembly of its decision to leave the League,
and (2) whether the withdrawal of such a state could become effec-
tive at the end of the two years' period, notwithstanding the fact that
her debt had not been repaid.
The case with Paraguay was far more complicated.89 On Febru-
ary 23, 1937, the date of the expiration of the two years' statutory
period, Paraguay was in default on a consolidated debt agreement,
on nine entire years in arrears and on budget year 1937.90 She had
allowed the withdrawal period to expire without answering the com-
munications of the Commission on Contributions and without mak-
ing any arrangements. Paraguay's behavior was to be expected after
its notification of the League on February 19, 1937, that its with-
drawal "[was] not to be regarded as complete and definite."91 A re-
port, which was adopted by the Assembly three days after her notice
of withdrawal, was received by the League; this report categorically
stated that before leaving the League, Paraguay would be required
to fulfill all her financial obligations up to the actual date of seces-
sion. Consequently, the legal question was whether Paraguay should
continue to be a member of the League and incur liability for addi-
tional contributions until it had settled its financial position.
Although the Legal Committee could have invoked Article 14
of the Covenant requesting the Permanent Court of Internal Justice
(PCIJ) to deliver an advisory opinion on the proper interpretation of
88. The Committee's arrangement called for part of Nicaragua's debt to be canceled
and the rest to be paid by annual installments spread over a period of twenty years.
89. Paraguay had been condemned, by a decision of the Council, as an aggressor state
that had violated her obligations under Article 12 and Article 15 of the Covenant. In pursu-
ance of this condemnation which concerned the hostilities that had broken out between Bolivia
and resulted in the declaration of war in May 1933, the embargo of arms imposed on Bolivia
was raised, and the embargo imposed on Paraguay was maintained. Under these circum-
stances, on February 24, 1935, Paraguay notified the League of the withdrawal. See ZIMMERN,
supra note 54, at 424-30. However, these political considerations were not taken into account
when the Assembly was discussing Paraguay's financial default.
90. Paraguay's unpaid contributions amounted to c.290,000 gold francs. In addition,
Paraguay had not repaid its share in the expenses of maintaining the Chaco Commission,
which was an emanation of the League trying to settle the Chaco dispute between her and
Bolivia.
91. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 589 (1937).
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Article 1(3), the Committee preferred to deal by itself with all three
cases. The Committee affirmatively answered the question of
whether the Assembly had the right to agree on reduction of a mem-
ber's debt that had already communicated the intention to withdraw.
According to the Covenant, the Assembly had the power to fix a
member's contributions. " The Assembly also retained the power to
reduce the amount of contributions retrospectively and to allow de-
ferred payments.9 8 A notice of withdrawal altered neither the power
of the Assembly nor the League status of that withdrawing state.
The state remained a Member State and its treatment was equal to
that of the remaining states. The right to secede was enshrined in
the Covenant, and a state could not be "punished" for expressing
such intention.
This answer given by the Committee was incorrect even though
the affirmative response was in accordance with the Covenant. The
question presented was whether "a reduction of debt" could be
granted and not whether "a reduction in the financial contributions
in arrears" was possible. The answer provided, based on Article 6(5)
of the Covenant, covered the latter but failed to answer the former.
Whereas in the majority of cases, the debt owed to the League was
the result of non-payment of contributions, there were cases where
debt resulted from non-payment of other financial obligations (e.g.
repayment of loans). The Legal Committee made no comment on
this point. It is doubtful whether the Assembly had the right to ar-
range a reduction in any debt owed by a state to the League, other
than a debt made up exclusively from financial contributions in ar-
rears. As argued, the purpose of Article 1(3) was to prevent states
that had violated their various obligations to escape the negative ef-
fects of their action by just seceding from the League. If a member
was not paying its debt (other than contributions) to the League,
and that Member State decided to notify its intention to withdraw,
the Assembly could not grant a reduction to its debt or it would
destroy all intents and purposes of Article 1(3).
The second question was whether a notice of withdrawal could
become effective on the expiration of the two years' period, even if at
that date, the state in question had not paid its entire debt. The Le-
gal Committee stated that if an arrangement for paying the debt in
installments was concluded with the state in question, withdrawal
would become effective if that state was not in default with respect
to any of the installments due before secession.94 The fact that the
92. See Covenant, supra note 19.
93. Id.
94. This answer followed to a large extent from the recommendation of the Special
Committee on Contributions on Arrears, which was approved by the Assembly in 1935. See
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debt was still not paid in full was irrelevant because under the ar-
rangement which regulated the relationship between that state and
the League, the only financial obligation to be fulfilled was the
proper payment of the installments. Therefore, the cases of Hondu-
ras and Nicaragua presented no difficulty provided that the relevant
annual installments were made on time.
The complete default of Paraguay's financial obligation made
her case quite different.96 A literal interpretation of Article 1(3) was
inappropriate because it led to the irrational conclusion that a de-
faulting state could remain in the League as a Member State en-
joying all the advantages and privileges of its membership and all
the obligations of the League towards it, while the deficit of the
League's budget increased year after year. It was illogical to main-
tain that a state remain in the League when it not only refused to
participate in League activities but also denied its membership. The
Committee took the view that the teleogical interpretation was more
appropriate. The drafters of the Covenant had intended that upon
expiration of the notice of withdrawal, the state in question was still
bound by all obligations which had accrued either under the Cove-
nant or otherwise. Having dealt with this preliminary point, the
question was then referred to a sub-committee whose reply did not
seek to give an interpretation applicable in all cases, but concen-
trated on the particular case of Paraguay.
In the sub-committee's opinion, Paraguay ceased being a mem-
ber of the League, notwithstanding her undoubted default regarding
her financial obligations. Paraguay would remain liable for this debt,
and the League was free to recover it by all the means at its dispo-
sal. Although this opinion represented the actual situation created
after her withdrawal, the First Committee did not regard it as advis-
able to include it in its reply. The main reason was that the Bolivian
representative expressly stated that he would not accept such an
opinion because as long as the territorial dispute with Paraguay
(Chaco Dispute) remained sub judice, Bolivia would regard Para-
guay as a member of the League. From the representative's point of
view, pecuniary obligations could not be separated from political or
legal obligations."
Interestingly enough, the Assembly endorsed the opinions of the
subcommittee. Although it refrained from declaring that Paraguay
had legally withdrawn from the League, it made clear that in all
Meyers, supra note 86, at 150.
95. When the Legal Committee was deliberating the position of Paraguay, more than
seven months had elapsed since her "official" withdrawal. In effect, the whole discussion was
rather philological.
96. This was a typical example of how the insistence of only one member could paralyze
the League at crucial moments.
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circumstances Paraguay owed to the League the full amount of its
arrears of contributions until the date of withdrawal. The Assembly
expressed its certainty that the component Committees would take
the necessary measures to deal with this matter. It was typical of the
Assembly to pass on responsibility to other organs rather than take
upon itself the affirmative action required under the circumstances.
The Assembly reached the conclusion that it would be to the
League's detriment to treat Paraguay as a state which was contrib-
uting to its expenses because this would have resulted in complicat-
ing the financial situation of the League.
During October 1937 the League was under the illusion that the
states that had withdrawn would eventually resume membership or
at least assume close co-operation with the League. In furtherance of
this deception the Assembly left a door open to Paraguay to settle its
financial obligations and to be treated once more as Member State
of the League. It reaffirmed that it was entitled to exercise its power
to take special decisions with regard to contributions of certain
League members "where it has thought it equitable to do so in the
interests of those Members . . . of the League itself and of sound
budgeting. ' 97 There is no doubt that the Assembly was referring to
the examples of Honduras and Nicaragua, whose debts were consid-
erably reduced and every possible arrangement was made to facili-
tate payment. But the Assembly failed (and apparently did so pur-
posely) to distinguish the striking difference between the two cases.
The reduction of the debts of Honduras and Nicaragua was ne-
gotiated and arranged while these states were still active members of
the League. The envisaged settlement of Paraguay's financial contri-
butions, however, had to be negotiated in a situation in which she
had declared de jure withdrawal from the League and the League
had de facto accepted that she was not to be regarded as a Member
State anymore. 98 Furthermore, the unwillingness of the Assembly to
clarify the legal position of Paraguay vis-a-vis the League99 created
in theory the following problem: suppose that Paraguay entered into
97. See Meyers, supra note 86, at 150.
98. De jure withdrawal means that Paraguay officials argued that she seceded from the
League in accordance with Article 1(3) of the Covenant (the withdrawal clause of the Cove-
nant) and, in effect, there was nothing illegal in her secession.
The fact that the League had de facto accepted that Paraguay was not to be regarded as
a Member State, means that the League did not recognize that Paraguay's secession was law-
ful under the terms of the Covenant, but because there was nothing much that the League
could have done about it, the League decided to act as if Paraguay had ceased to be a Member
State.
99. In this connection, see BAKER, supra note 64, at 154, Baker, commenting on the
notices of withdrawal of Germany, Japan, and Paraguay, suggested that a resolution at the
1936 Assembly should "make it plain to the withdrawing states and to the world at large" that
it did not consider that these states "have legally freed themselves from the obligations which
the Covenant involves." Id.
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negotiations in order to have its debt reduced, and at a later stage it
repaid its debt, what would have been her legal position then?
Would Paraguay's withdrawal become effective according to Article
1(3), or would she be regarded as a Member State with full status
whose previous notice of withdrawal was null and void because on
the date that notice expired, Paraguay had fulfilled none of its finan-
cial obligations?
Contrary to Paraguay's persistent refusal to settle its financial
obligations toward the League, the practice was that withdrawing
states had to meet the obligation of contributing their quota to the
budget before the period of notice expired. After they withdrew,
Brazil and Costa Rica received distributions of budget surpluses that
had accrued during their membership.100 In addition, following Ger-
many's submission of its notice of withdrawal, the German govern-
ment paid part of its contributions in arrears in gold. Most of its
accounts were settled before secession became effective. Like Hondu-
ras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, however, Hungary and Peru were
also in arrears in their contributions to the League's budget at the
expiration of their membership. After 1940, all these states failed to
keep up their annuities under the consolidated arrears contracts.
VI. Which Other Obligations Had to be Fulfilled
It is not clear, apart from the financial obligations, what other
obligations the drafters of the Covenant had envisioned when they
provided in Article 1(3) that "all obligations under this Covenant
shall be fulfilled at the time of withdrawal."' 10 1 Article 18 stipulated
an obligation that every treaty, to which a League member was a
contracting party, had to be registered with the League's Secretariat.
Article 18 acted in conjunction with Article 20 whose purpose was to
insure that members of the League never entered into engagements
that were inconsistent with the terms of the covenant. 02 This never
happened in practice, however, because in May 1920, the Council
approved the Memorandum on Article 18 which declared that one
100. See Meyers, supra note 86, at 148. Costa Rica's letter to the Secretary General of
the League expressing its decision to withdraw (December 1924) was accompanied by a check
to cover its contributions from 1921 to 1924. Id.
101. Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 1(3).
102. Judge Schukind, in his separate Opinion in the Oscar Chinn Case stated that:
". Article 20 would possess little value unless treaties concluded in violation of that under-
taking were to be regarded as absolutely null and void; that is to say, as being automatically
void." See Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 90 (1934).
Criticizing Judge Schukind's view, G. Schwarzenberger stated that strict adherence to the
obligation that every member register every treaty could have led to the following paradox. If
a treaty had already been registered with the Secretariat by another signatory party-member
of the League, thus satisfying the purpose of Article 18, but another signatory party-member
had not registered the treaty, such state would have been held to have violated its obligations
under the Covenant. 1 SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 466 (1945).
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party could register a treaty in the name of all parties at the same
time.10 8
Article 18 also contained its own means of compliance because
it stipulated that "no such treaty shall be binding until so regis-
tered." 104 Therefore, it would have been to the detriment of a Mem-
ber State to fail to register a treaty because such treaties would have
been unenforceable. It appears that this was only the theory, how-
ever, because in practice things were fundamentally different. There
are two relevant cases on this matter.
The first case concerned the French-Mexican Claims Conven-
tion, which was signed on September 25, 1924, at a time when Mex-
ico was not a member. By virtue of this Convention, a Mixed Claims
Commission was set up. In July 1928, a Mexican agent contended,
during the case of France (Pablo Najera) v. Mexico,103 that the Con-
vention was not binding because the French government had failed
to show that it had been presented for registration with the League's
Secretariat. Based on Article 18, the Commission's President com-
mented that although such an omission did not affect the validity of
a non-registered treaty between the parties, it did preclude them
from invoking the treaty before any organ of the League and any
international tribunal.106 Article 18 neither impaired the binding
force among the members of the League of a duly ratified treaty nor
did it impair the members' option to withdraw from the League.
However, Article 18 precluded parties from invoking the treaty as
obligatory before the Assembly, the Council, and the PCIJ.
The second case concerned the General Treaty of Peace and
Amity, which was signed in Washington, D.C. on February 7, 1923,
by the five Central American Republics but was never registered
with the Secretariat. 07 Then, in late 1931 a military coup d'etat as-
sumed the Presidency of El Salvador. This action directly contra-
vened Article 2 of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity, which
read:
[E]very act ...which alters the constitutional organiza-
103. Memorandum on the Registration and Publication of Treaties, May 19, 1920, 1
L.N.T.S. 7.
104. Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 18.
105. Annual Digest of International Law Cases 1927-28, Case No. 271); 1
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 102, at 176; H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
339 (1952); Hudson, Legal Effect of Unregistered Treaties in Practice, Under Article 18 of
the Covenant, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1934).
106. On August 4, 1928 the Convention was registered with the Secretariat at the re-
quest of the French Government, 79 L.N.T.S. 417 (1928). It appears that the President was
not informed of the registration.
107. All five states were members of the League in 1923 and, with the exception of
Costa Rica, continued to be Member States until the League's dissolution in 1945. General
Treaty of Peace and Amity of the Central American States, signed in Washington, D.C. on
Feb. 7, 1923, 2 HUDSON 901, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 117 (1923) [hereinafter Amity].
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tion in any of [these states] is to be deemed a menace to the
peace of the said republics . . . the governments will not recog-
nize any other government which may come into power in any of
the five republics through a coup d'etat . .. .18
The National Assembly in the new regime in El Salvador took action
to denounce this Treaty. In August 1933 by unanimous vote, the
National Assembly declared that the Treaty was legally non-existent
because it had not been registered with the League's Secretariat.
The PCIJ did not address itself to the possible legal effects of the
non-registration of treaties, nor did it refuse to take into considera-
tion instruments that had not been registered.
Although Article 1(3) had problems in practice as is evidenced
by these two cases, one of the main aims of the Covenant's Article
1(3) was to prevent States from violating their various obligations
under the Covenant and then leaving the League. Exclusion of Arti-
cle 12 (submission of all disputes to arbitration of judicial settle-
ment); Article 13 (carry out in full faith any award or decision ren-
dered); and Article 15 (submission of disputes to the Council) from
the ambit of Article 1(3) would destroy these intents. The purpose of
including Articles 12, 13, and 15 was to eliminate the possibility of
war among the Member States. These articles formed part of a
treaty that signalled the end of World War I, one of the bloodiest
wars ever fought. The obligations imposed by Articles 12, 13, and 15
could be characterized as international obligations which stemmed
from either statutory or customary provisions of international law.
Some of these obligations include: the duty of states to give effect to
any award or decision that was delivered against them;"0 9 the duty
not to resort to war against a country that had complied with a judg-
ment emanating from a recognized international court or tribunal;
and the duty to have a case heard by its natural judge.110
It cannot be accepted that the obligation undertaken by the sig-
natories to diminish the probability of war was contemplated by the
Leagues founders. The primary function of the League was the
maintenance of a world order which was to be achieved through
peaceful settlement of international disputes.'11 An intriguing ques-
tion is whether participation in the workings of the Assembly was
one of the duties under the Covenant which a state needed to fulfill
in order to secede from the League. This duty would have been im-
posed by a strict interpretation of Articles 3 and 5; Article 3 pro-
108. Id.
109. See Article 59 of the Statute of the PCIJ: "The decision of the Court has no bind-
ing force except between the Parties and in respect of that particular case." This article, in an
a contrary fashion, obliged states to carry out the award made.
110. See Covenant, supra note 19, art. 13(3) and art. (4).
111. 1 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 102, at 48.
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vided that the Assembly was composed of all Member States of the
League and that the Assembly had to meet at fixed intervals, and
Article 5 provided that most decisions of the Assembly required una-
nimity. The refusal of a member to participate in the Assembly
would have resulted not only in blocking the activities of this organ,
but also in obstructing the proper functioning of the League.
Argentina's position toward the League during its very first
years provides an answer to this question. During the First Assembly
in 1920, the Argentine delegation instituted the most revolutionary
proposal connected with the problem of admitting new members to
the League. The proposal was for Article 1 to be amended to read:
"all sovereign states recognized by the community of nations be ad-
mitted to the League of Nations in such a manner that if they do not
become Member States this can only be a result of a voluntary deci-
sion on their part." '112 The Argentine delegation was pressing for uni-
versal membership in the League."'
The First Assembly proposed postponement of all amendments
to the Covenant. The Argentine government regarded this decision
as a personal injury and its representative voted against it. Once the
arrangement was adopted, the Argentine representative issued simul-
taneous notes to both the President of the Assembly and to the press,
announcing that Argentina was withdrawing from the meetings of
the Assembly, however, she would continue to be a Member State of
the League; the representative considered the delegation's mission to
be at an end."1 4
Despite the Argentine proposal, the wording of Article 1 was
never amended. Consequently, Argentina withdrew from active sup-
port of the League, thus, constituting a breach of a Covenantal obli-
gation. Although Argentina never expressed her willingness to secede
from the League, if we suppose for the sake of argument, that such
willingness was communicated to the Secretary General, it becomes
obvious that her withdrawal could not have become effective because
she was fulfilling a duty prescribed by the Covenant. In other words,
112. See Friedlander, The Admission of States to the League of Nations, 1928 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 84, 94. What actually happened to the Argentine proposal is unclear. Friedland
wrote that the Legal Committee of the Second Assembly thought that the suggested, amend-
ment was "unsatisfactory, unreasonable and unacceptable" and, thus, it was summarily re-
jected. Id. at 95. In contrast, Hill argued that the proposal was considered at length during
that session of the Assembly, but in the absence of the Argentine delegation a decision was
deferred. D. Hill, The Second Assembly of the League of Nations, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 59
(1922)..
113. The Assembly decided that no amendments to the Covenant should be considered
before the League was firmly established, but it did agree to appoint a Committee on Amend-
ments and await its report at the next annual session. See Gregory, The First Assembly of the
League of Nations, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 240, 245 (1921).
114. Hudson, supra note 87, at 457, also notes that it was in Argentina's capacity as a
League Member that she was represented at a meeting of the Governing Body of ILO at
Stockholm in July 1921.
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Argentina would have had to resume active participation in the
League to lawfully exercise its right of secession. Here lies the para-
dox of a literal interpretation of Article 1(3).
One of the consequences of such a literal interpretation of the
withdrawal clause was that no Member State could have left it after
the eruption of the Sino-Japanese conflict. At the time of the Sino-
Japanese conflict all the States had failed to fulfill their obligations
of preserving the territorial integrity of China under Article 10 of
the Covenant." 5 The best solution would have been to examine every
notice of withdrawal in the light of the relevant issues and circum-
stances, to decide whether strict adherence to the relevant clauses
was imperative and justified.
VII. Who Was to Decide Whether Obligations were Fulfilled -
The Withdrawal of Brazil
The next problem was the failure of the drafters to include any
description of the method which was to be used to determine
whether a withdrawing state had fulfilled all its prescribed duties.
On August 19, 1919, President Wilson noted this problem when he
informed the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs at the Cov-
enant's inception, it was not determined who would determine
whether obligations had been fulfilled."' It was recognized that it
must be left to be resolved by the conscience of the nation proposing
to withdraw. Wilson explained his thoughts on the issue when he
said:
...and I must say that it did not seem to me worthwhile to
propose that the article be made more explicit because I know
that the United States would never itself propose to withdraw
from the League if its conscience was not entirely clear as to the
fulfillment of all its international obligations. It has never failed
to fulfill them and never will.117
President Wilson concluded that the only restraining influence for a
country that had violated her obligations to secede from the League
would be the public opinion of the world.118 Future developments
proved that Wilson was wrong.
The stance taken by Wilson was echoed both in the Senate and
in the Lodge Reservations of November 1919. In the text accompa-
nying the first reservation, the Senate made it quite clear that the
"United States, which has never broken an international obligation,
[could not] permit its conduct and honor [to be] questioned by other
115. See X, Termination of the League of Nations, 1935 BAIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 154.
116. See, H. LODGE, supra note 7, at 297, 309.
117. Id.
118. This is the so-called Wilsonian interpretation. Id.
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nations. The same must be said in regard to the fulfillment of the
obligations to the League." '119 In effect, the United States alone was
to determine this question and its right of withdrawal had to be un-
conditional, as provided in the reservation. 120
During the drafting of the Covenant, it was argued that some
organ of the League should be competent to decide this question.
The discussion, however, was cut short of actually reaching an
agreement. M. Burgoes, the representative of Panama, put the argu-
ment eloquently:
If any doubt arose in regard to, the precise meaning of the
text of the Rules of the League, would it not be desirable to
create an organization for the purpose of setting at rest any pos-
sible doubts in regard to the interpretation of the text of the
Statutes -of the League and even to deal with questions as to
whether the Covenant of the League had been violated or
not? 121
Burgoes changed his mind on the issue of whether a new organiza-
tion had to be created because he argued: "Is that not indeed the
proper task of the Assembly of Delegates, as they constitute the Su-
preme International Tribunal and is not the Assembly which gives
the Covenant its life?"'
1 22
David Hunter Miller, the Senior Legal Advisor to the U.S. dele-
gation, vigorously attacked the argument that the right of with-
drawal had to be passed upon by a League organ. Miller was of the
opinion that this contention was totally unfounded. Not only the text
of the Covenant was silent on this point, but no argument could be
advanced that one way or another either the Council or the Assem-
bly could pronounce a decision that the various obligations had been
observed. His argument was based on the theory of state sovereignty.
Under state sovereignty, no foreign entity (even if such entity was
created by the consent of the state in question) could pass judgment
on such a delicate and subtle matter, unless the relevant jurisdiction
had been expressly conferred upon it. The right of withdrawal was
given to each member of the League to be exercised at its own unfet-
tered discretion 2 because no such jurisdiction was mentioned or
even implied in the draft Covenant.
There is no doubt that the right to secede had general applica-
tion. The League of Nations was just an experiment in international
political cooperation. The right to secede needed to be unqualified
119. See Commentary, supra note 2.
120. See H. LODGE, supra note 7, at 173. See also C. Fenwick, supra note 25, at 518.
121. See PAPERS RELATING . supra note 3, at 309.
122. Id.
123. See Burns, supra note 6, at 47.
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because otherwise a number of states would have been unwilling to
join it. When a Member State chose to leave the League, however, it
was under the unwritten obligation to exercise this right with the
minimum possible trouble for the League.
When in June 1926 Brazil relinquished its nonpermanent seat in
the Council and gave the statutory notice of withdrawal, it selected
"a time when it [could not] affect the League's word."1 4 Brazil's
withdrawal occurred during the so-called Council crisis of 1926,
which concerned the eventual membership of Germany in the
League. 128 When Germany was finally persuaded to apply for mem-
bership, it was with the supposed understanding that such a Council
seat would be afforded. Germany dispatched its application to be-
come a Member State on February 8, 1926. Four days later, the
Council called an extraordinary session of the Assembly for March
8, 1926 to finalize its acceptance.""
Several Member States of the League attempted to use the fo-
rum of the Assembly in order to achieve permanent seats for them-
selves. There were three main contestants: Brazil, Spain, and Po-
land. ' 7 By virtue of Article 4(1) of the Covenant the former two
states already enjoyed the status of a nonpermanent member of the
Council. 2 ' Poland based is claim on its importance as a major power
in the European scene. Spain's candidacy was based on the historical
grounds that it once was a great power.' 29 Brazil based her applica-
tion upon a claim for a more appropriate representation of the
American Continent. It appears that Brazil put forward this argu-
ment only to further her candidacy. The ten American delegations at
this special session of the Assembly disassociated themselves and did
not support this claim. Uruguay was another state that had applied
for a permanent seat. M. Guani, the President of the Council and a
Uruguay citizen, referred to fuller American representation, but dis-
agreed that the Brazilian ambassador had attempted to meet that
end.
Meanwhile, Germany was not willing to accept admission to the
League if another state beyond itself were to increase the member-
124. See D. Meyers, Representation in the League of Nations Council, 20 AM. J. INT'L
L. 689 (1926). [hereinafter Representation].
125. For the background and course of the crisis, See G. SCELLE, UNE CRISE DE LA
SOCIETE DES NATIONS (1927).
126. See KIMMICH, supra note 55, at 76-91.
127. According to KIMMICH, nine states applied for permanent seats; the number given
by MEYERS is only four. See Representation, supra note 124. See also KIMMICH, supra note
55.
128. Until the Assembly had selected the four nonpermanent members of the Council,
the Covenant provided that the representatives of Greece, Belgium, Brazil, and Spain would
occupy the relevant seats.
129. As the Spanish Representative in the Council stated: "My government is unable to
accept a classification which would place Spain among the second rank of powers."
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ship in the Council. There was resentment on the German side that
"lesser powers" might join the Council with a permanent seat and its
importance would be diminished. In February 1926 the German cab-
inet had unanimously agreed that unless it was assured a permanent
seat without further enlargement of the Council, it would withdraw
its application.
The crisis came on March 15, 1926, when the Brazilian dele-
gate to the Council declared that his government was determined to
veto Germany's admission to the Council unless Brazil was given the
much desired permanent seat. Brazil took advantage of the unanim-
ity rule in Article 5(1) of the Covenant. Article 5(1) provided that
decisions at any meeting of the Council required the agreement of
all Member States represented at the meeting. No agreement was
produced because Brazil and Spain would not be persuaded to alter
their course of action. 130 The question of Germany's admission had
to be postponed until the Assembly's ordinary meeting in September
1926.
The Council tried during various meetings to resolve the crisis.
In the final meeting of the 40th session of the Council on June 10,
1926, Brazil -resigned her nonpermanent seat selecting "a time when
it [could not] affect the League's work."131 The next session of the
Council would have coincided with the ordinary September session
of the Assembly. The session of the Assembly would have been em-
powered to fill Brazil's vacant seat without delay, and thus, the una-
nimity required for the admission of Germany as a permanent mem-
ber of the Council would have been achieved. However, the
relinquishment of Brazil's seat in the Council and its subsequent
withdrawal from the League were preceded by an interpretation by
its representative of Article 5(1). In the opinion of the Brazilian rep-
resentative, although the Council could meet without the presence of
all members' representatives,32 it did not have the competence to
take any decision or any action if one of its Member States had ei-
ther resigned or severed its relations with the League.
The Brazilian representative reassured the Council that his
country "was anxious to avoid giving rise by her resignation to any
difficulty concerning the interpretation of Article 5(1)." 1s33 The im-
portance Brazil attached to the legal question concerning the proper
130. In the Council's meeting of March 15, 1926, Brazil materialized her threat by
voting against Germany's membership. See N. Hill, Unanimous Consent in International Or-
ganizations, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 318 (1928).
131. See Representation, supra note 124, at 690.
132. According to Article 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council, actions might be
taken when a quorum consisting of only a majority of its Member States was present. Hill
described this provision as "a concession to practical necessity, which no smooth running or-
ganization can fail to make." D. Hill, supra note 112, at 327.
133. See Stone, The Rule of Unanimity, 1933 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 18, 29-30.
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interpretation of this provision was not shared by the other states
concerned. Italy did not commit itself, and M. Paul-Boncour, the
chairman of the Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, summarily
rejected the Brazilian proposition because ". . . nothing can prevent
the Council from continuing its work in case of necessity.
' 134
The Council itself totally ignored this legal question. In the be-
ginning of September 1926, the Council sat for five days carrying
out its business in a normal way, notwithstanding the absence of
Brazil.1"' On September 8, 1926, the Assembly voted unanimously
to accept Germany as a Member State with a permanent seat on the
Council. Brazil's course of action was incorrectly calculated because
it had exactly the opposite result from what Brazil had originally
contemplated. Instead of securing its election as a permanent mem-
ber of the Council, Brazil found itself out of the League altogether.
Meanwhile, the Wilsonian interpretation of the withdrawal
clause, in which the state giving notice of withdrawal would be the
sole judge of whether it had fulfilled all obligations, did not find any
support. Although this interpretation was in accordance with the
'principle of state sovereignty and might be acceptable in bilateral
agreements, it was unacceptable in an entity with an international
dimension where the action or inaction of one Member State had
direct consequences on the action of the other members.
Another question that arose during the drafting of the Cove-
nant, but apparently was not dealt with at that time of the Cove-
nant's construction, was whether determining the question of obser-
vance of all obligations was necessary every time a Member State
announced its intention to secede or only if there was some doubt
over the existence of unfulfilled obligations. The literal interpretation
of Article 1(3) (i.e., every single international obligation and every
single obligation under the Covenant had to be fulfilled) would lead
to the conclusion that every withdrawing state had to prove that such
duties were observed. This interpretation would have been most un-
desirable, however, because it would have added further problems to
the cumbersome workings of the League.
Commentators have suggested different entities for dealing with
this question. One proposal was that the Council should decide the
question by virtue of its power under Article 16(4) to expel a Mem-
ber State who had violated any covenant of the League.1 36 This pro-
posal was not very persuasive, however, because it did not explain
134. Id.
135. Spain also did not participate during that session, owing to its insistence on turning
its nonpermanent seat into a permanent one, but it did not withdraw, although at one point it
had signified its intention to do so.
136. Burns, supra note 6, at 49.
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why the Council's function under Article 16(4) should be enforced
by analogy in Article 1(3). More importantly, the decision of
whether international obligations were fulfilled or not remained
outside the power of the Council. Expulsion could only have been
ordered for violation of duties under the Covenant, and not for inter-
national obligations.
Other commentators have urged that the proper body was the
Assembly because it was the entity of the League that represented
the entire membership. The Assembly could draw its power to decide
from the wording of Article 3(3) of the Covenant: "The Assembly
may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action
of the League."1 87 Definitely the examination of the performance of
a withdrawing state fell into the Assembly's "sphere of action."
SchUckind and Wehberg, 13 authors of the authoritative commentary
of the Covenant, have argued that both the Assembly and the Coun-
cil were inappropriate to reach a decision because the League would
have been a party. In their view, such arrangement would have been
contrary to the demands of impartialr justice because the League
would simultaneously be the applicant, the prosecutor, and the
judge. SchUckind and Wehberg's suggestion was that under Article
14 the Council should submit a request to the PCIJ for an advisory
opinion, and on the basis of this opinion reach a decision. 139
Wright, a leading international law writer, also shared this
view. He argued that treaty interpretation was generally declared
suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement in Article
13(2) of the Covenant. It would also seem in accord with the word-
ing of Article 13(2) and with the established practice, for the Coun-
cil to submit the question of whether a state had fulfilled her duties
and consequently was entitled to withdraw to the PCIJ for advisory
opinion." 0
This proposal would not have altered the situation. At the end
of the day it would have been the Council that would have rendered
the decision that may or may not have been in accord with the non-
binding advisory opinion of the PCIJ. The League accepted that
once the withdrawal notice had expired, nothing could prevent a
state from severing her relations with the League completely, thus,
there was little sense in trying to determine whether duties were
breached or obligations were neglected. The withdrawing state was
137. Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 3(3).
138. 1 SCHOCKING & WEHBERG, supra note 30, at 373.
139. See also Fenwick, supra note 25, at 518 (He questioned whether the PCIJ could
"survey the whole range of International relations of the withdrawing state" in order to detect
unfulfilled duties.) Id.
140. Wright, Some Legal Aspects of the Far Eastern Situation, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 509,
514 (1933).
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the sole judge in this case and only the embarrassment of the public
opinion of the international community could have restrained her
from leaving the League.
Although many amendments to the Covenant were proposed at
various stages, none referred to the inclusion of a new provision deal-
ing with this rather subtle question of who was to determine whether
a withdrawing state had fulfilled all her obligations. The perfect so-
lution would have been if the Assembly adopted an exhaustive list
stipulating which duties were to be observed at all times and ap-
pointing a special committee. The special committee members would
be selected at random and would offer a binding decision to the
withdrawing state explaining that secession could not legally take
place unless and until that state had honored the committee's
decision.
VIII. De Facto Withdrawal
In its Ordinary Session of September 1936, the Assembly was
concerned with the problem of de facto withdrawal of a League
member."' This problem surfaced during the Italian-Ethiopian dis-
pute. It raised the legal question of whether Ethiopia continued to
enjoy its right of representation in the Assembly and its right of par-
ticipating in the League's activities when its territory had been in-
vaded, occupied, and formally annexed by Italy. This is especially
true when Italy's actions, as a fellow Member State, constituted an
indisputable and clear breach of the Covenant.
On May 3, 1936, the Emperor of Abyssinia left his country and
six days later an Italian royal decree purported to place Ethiopia
under Italian sovereignty. Although the Emperor was in exile, he of-
ficially continued to represent Ethiopia in her foreign relations. On
September 16, 1936, the Abyssinian delegation in London an-
nounced that its country was sending a delegation in the forthcoming
session of the Assembly. The Credential Committee of the Assembly
was faced with the difficult task of deciding whether the credential
of the Abyssian delegation issued by a Head of State in exile should
be recognized.
The Committee considered the credentials as sufficient to permit
that delegation to sit at the present session. The reasoning was that
the Emperor was still recognized by all Great Powers as the lawful
sovereign of Ethiopia. It was also in the powers of the Emperor to
issue credentials. If the Committee had refused recognition, this
would have meant a suspension from the exercise of rights of mem-
141. "De facto withdrawal" occurs when a League member withdraws without observ-
ing the relevant procedure.
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bership with the concomitant provisional cessation of its duties to the
League. It was improper for the League to envisage a situation in
which Ethiopia was deprived of her membership's rights, but at the
same time the League expected her to fulfill all her obligations. It
was at the Emperor's discretion to inform the League of suspension
from the exercise of such rights in view of the occupation of his
country by a hostile army, and the cessation of normal governmental
functions. As long as Ethiopia was observing its duties, it had the
right to be represented in the Assembly and to participate in the
activities convened under the aegis of the League. 42 In fact, the
League did continue to regard her as a full member, and at the be-
ginning of 1938, Ethiopia rendered payment of its membership dues.
The position of Member States vis-a-vis their membership when
they were occupied and administered by other states was examined
in two other cases. On April 7, 1939, the Kingdom of Albania was
invaded .by the Italian armed forces. Once in power, the Italian au-
thorities convened a body called the "Constituent Assembly," which
was composed of Albanians and which duly offered the Albanian
Crown to the King of Italy. Following its acceptance by Italy on
April 14, 1939, an Albanian puppet government set up along Italian
fascist lines gave notice of withdrawal to the League.""3 This notice
was not taken at face value by the Secretary General because of
those surrounding circumstances. Ultimately, the Council referred
the question of Albanian's withdrawal to the Assembly for it to
reach a decision. However, the Assembly did not consider this ques-
tion at its December 1939 session, and subsequently, Albania was
retained in the budget for a token annual payment of financial con-
tributions as well as retained on the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO) list of Member States.
As a result of the progressive decline of the League, the vigor-
ous protests of the exiled King Zog of Albania failed to lead any-
where. The British Government afforded asylum to King Zog on the
strict condition that he agreed not to engage in any political activity.
However, in November 1939 the British government also granted de
facto recognition to the new fascist regime when it applied to the
142. A leading commentator argued that the decision of the Credentials Committee was
immaterial to the question of Ethiopia's membership in the League. Even if the Assembly were
to decide that the issued credentials could no longer be recognized, this would not have af-
fected the position towards the League. Ethiopia would continue to enjoy its membership as
long as the League as a whole, or the substantial majority of its members had not de jure
recognized her annexation by Italy, or terminated her membership as a result of voluntary
withdrawal or expulsion. Lauterpacht, The Credentials of the Abyssinian Delegation, 1937
BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 184, 186.
143. See PAPERS RELATING . supra note 3, at 75; K. MARACK, IDENTITY AND CON-
TINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968); R. LANGER, SEIZURE OF TERRI-
TORY 245-50 (1947).
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Italian government for an exequatur for the British consul in Du-
razzo. Contrary to the British attitude, most countries refused to ac-
cept the Italian conquest, yet the United States of America, Egypt,
and Turkey allowed the Albanian legations to remain on their soil.
It is submitted that Albania never ceased being a member of
the League. Article 31 of the Italian Peace Treaty of February 10;
1947 reads: "Italy recognizes that all agreements and arrangements
made between Italy and the authorities installed in Albania by Italy
from April 7, 1939 to September 3, 1943 are null and void." '44 The
notice of withdrawal falls into the ambit of such an "arrangement,"
because it was a unilateral decision of the occupying Power which
followed from Italy's withdrawal from the League. By virtue of the
Covenant's Article 31 it was null and void ab initio, and Albania
was neither bound nor was it in any way affected by it.
The second case concerned, the annexation of Austria by Ger-
many. The emergence of Austria at the end of World War I as the
Austrian Republic and the protection of her independence was one
of the cornerstones of the Peace Treaties. 45 On March 13, 1938, the
Federal Constitutional Law was promulgated by the Austrian gov-
ernment (in reality a Nazi regime set up by Germany) by which
Austria was united with the Third Reich. From that day forward
Austria enjoyed the status of a German Land.
By proceeding with the so-called annexation (Anschliiss), Ger-
many clearly violated her conventional obligations arising out of Ar-
ticles 80 and 434 of the Versailles Treaty. According to Article 434,
Germany recognized in advance the treaties concluded by the Allied
Powers with her ex-allies, which covered the Saint Germain Treaty.
Germany further violated her freely accepted obligations under the
Gentlemen Agreement of July 11, 1936.146
144. Italian Peace Treaty, Feb. 10, 1947, 49 U.N.T.S. 53 (Albania ratified it on Octo-
ber 20, 1947).
145. Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles provided that:
Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Aus-
tria within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and
the Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with
the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.
Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 80. The Treaty of SaintGermain was a boundary-fixing
treaty. A provision to the same effect was included in the Treaty of Saint-Germain, where
Article 88 imposed upon Austria the obligation "to abstain from any act which might compro-
mise her independence." Id. at art. 88.
This obligation and the importance that the Powers placed upon her independence was
reaffirmed on a number of occasions. See the Restoration of Austria Protocol No. I (Declara-
tion), signed in Geneva, October 4, 1922, 12 L.N.T.S. 385. The Protocol was interpreted by
the P.C.I.J. in its Advisory Opinion in the Austro-German Customs Regime Case, 2 Hudson
World Court Reports, series A/B, no. 41, 711-43 (1931), annotated by Borchard in 25 AM. J.
INT'L L. 711 (1931). See also the Geneva Protocol of July 15, 1932, 135 L.N.T.S. 285, 6
HUDSON 84. K. MARACK, supra note 143, at 338, wrongly refers to this Protocol as the "Lau-
sanne Protocol."
146. The Gentlemen Agreement committed Germany to respecting the independence of
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Then, on March 21, 1938, the German Foreign Office commu-
nicated to the Secretary General that because of the Constitutional
Law, "the federal state of Austria ceased to be a League member"
from the date of its promulgation. The Secretary General stated that
there was no place in the League for an entity that had only the
legal status of a German Land. 4 " However, the Assembly took a
different course of action and decided that Germany's communica-
tion was not a proper notice of withdrawal. The Assembly accepted
that the Anschlfiss had resulted in a completely different situation,
and it made no claim for payment by Austria of her budgetary obli-
gations after March 18, 1938.
The annexation of Ethiopia by Italy differed from the annexa-
tion of Austria by Germany in three very important respects:
A) Italy's annexation of Ethiopia did not lead to Ethiopia's ter-
mination of League membership, whereas Germany's annexa-
tion of Austria did lead to Austria's termination of League
membership;
B) No government body of the Austrian State was left to assert
and carry on its legal continuity;
C) Ethiopia's annexation to Italy was never officially recognized
either by its Emperor or by any League Member,"4 whereas
Austria's annexation to Germany was recognized both by Aus-
tria herself"'9 and by a large membership of the League. With
little delay, the state governments in the international arena, in-
cluding Great Britain and France, recognized that Austria had
ceased to exist as a sovereign and independent state and accord-
ingly withdrew their legations from Vienna and replaced them
with consulates.
On April 6, 1938, the U.S. Secretary of State declared that the
United States was "under the necessity for all practical purposes of
accepting" that Austria was a part of Germany. As a result, the
U.S. Legation in Austria was closed and a Consulate General was
Austria. The Agreement is reprinted in GRENVILLE, supra note 62, at 172-74.
147. Garner, Questions of State Succession Raised by the German Annexation of Aus-
tria, 1938 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 421, 423. See also Wright, The Legality of the Annexation of
Austria by Germany, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 621 (1944). See also KLINGHOFFER, LES ASPECTS
JURIDIQUES BE L' OCCUPATION DE L' AUTRICHE (1943).
148. However, it should be noted that in 1938 Great Britain withdrew her recognition of
Abyssinia as an independent state by recognizing de jure that the Italian annexation of the
Ethiopian Empire. The British government stated on December 21, 1936, that its act of closing
the Legation in Addis Abbaba and replacing it with a consulate did not constitute a de jure
recognition of the Italian annexation. See H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 351-52 (1948). See also ROUSSEAU. LE CONFLIT ITALO-ETHIOPIEN DEVANT LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 241-42 (1938).
149. On April 10, 1938, a plebiscite was held in which the Austrian peoples were asked
whether they approved of the incorporation into Germany. 99.73% of the population voted for
the Anschliss. "The very result . . . is sufficient to indicate its untrustworthiness," WRIGHT,
ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS AUSTRIA 89 (1944).
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established in its place.18 0 This pronouncement contradicted the
Stimson Doctrine. 11
The United States government declared that it did not intend to
recognize any territories created by force contrary to the obligations
prescribed by the pact of Paris of August 27, 1928.182 In agreement
with the Stimson Doctrine, the United States government refused to
recognize the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy, and later the Italian
invasion in Albania. According to the principles of international law
of that era, to be recognized as a state, the following five require-
ments1 58 had to be satisfied:
1) Be represented by a government which received de facto alle-
giance from its subjects;
2) Be a sovereign independent state;
3) Exhibit reasonable purpose of durability;
4) Possess definite territories;
5) Be recognized as a member of the family of nations.
Austria definitely was lacking the second and fourth require-
ments. This situation raised several issues. First, how was League
membership affected by a state's extinction resulting from conquest
or annexation. When Austria was annexed by Germany, it had to
secede from the League since Germany was no longer a Member
State. The problem could have been resolved if Austria had commu-
nicated the required notice of withdrawal. This would have been un-
acceptable to Germany, however, it would have indicated that Aus-
tria was to be regarded as an independent and sovereign state for the
next two years. Another solution to the problem would have been
amending the Covenant to cater to such instances, but it is doubtful
150. The almost general recognition of Austrian's annexation and its consequent extinc-
tion as a state under international law removed any possible basis for the contention that it
sustained a de jure relation to the League. Its name disappeared from the League's roster as
well as from the list of Members of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Uni-
versal Postal Union (UPU). The legal significance created a Consulate General in Austria and
was made known by the State Department on July 29, 1942: "This Government very clearly
made known its opinion as to the manner in which the seizure of Austria took place . . .[it]
has never taken the position that Austria was legally absorbed into the German Reich." This
explanation was quoted in United States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 46 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y.
1942). See also United States ex rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 898 (2nd Cir. 1943).
151. The Stimson Doctrine was made after the Japanese invasion in Machuria and dom-
inated its foreign relations at that time. The declaration was issued on January 7 in a note
addressed to China and Japan. In March 1932 Great Britain together with other members of
the League declared to be bound by a similar and, having regard to the provisions of the
Covenant, wider obligation. For commentary, see Wright, The Stimson Note of 7 January
1932, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 342 (1932). See also McNair, The Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recog-
nition, 1933 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 65.
152. Treaty providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. This Treaty was also known as the Briand-Kellog Pact of
which both China and Japan as well as the United States were parties. The Treaty was effec-
tively replaced by Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
153. See BIRKENHEAD, INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-32 (6th ed. 1927).
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whether such an amendment would have enjoyed retrospective effect
in Austria's case.
A second issue that arose was whether the law of state succes-
sion included an obligation on Germany, the successor country, to
assume the payments owed by Austria to the League. When Austria
ceased to be a Member State, it was in arrears of its membership
dues. Also, Austria was under a financial obligation to the League
because it had not repaid the advances it had received under the
Guaranteed Reconstruction Loan of 1923.15"
The doctrine of the jurists was formulated in which the respon-
sibility for the payment of the annexed state's debts was assumed by
the annexing country.155 It was irrelevant whether annexation was
achieved through conquest or voluntary merger. 15  On June 16,
1938, the German Minister for Economics emphatically rejected the
validity of this proposition and asserted that "neither by interna-
tional law nor in the interests of economic policy, nor morally, is
there any obligation on the part of the Third Reich to acknowledge
the legal responsibility for Austria's Federal Debt." Even if Austria
had wanted- to repay her debts, this would have been impossible be-
cause Austria was deprived of both its fiscal autonomy and sources
of revenue, consequently leaving left no means for such
repayment.
1 57
IX. The Withdrawal of Japan
Japan gave her notice of secession on March 27, 1933.15 s The
reason for this action was that Japan along with Germany and Italy,
the signatories to the Treaty of September 7, 1940, established the
154. This Loan, popularly known as the "League Loan," was envisaged in the Geneva
Protocol of October 4, 1922. The loan had the following main purposes and intentions: 1) to
save Austria from complete economic ruin and bankruptcy by enabling it to meet pressing
financial obligations, and 2) to rehabilitate it and keep it from being annexed by Germany.
The Loan was floated under the aegis of the League and the sum involved was the equivalent
of $126 million. See Salter, The Financial Reconstruction of Austria, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 116
(1923).
155. See E. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION (1931). See also A.
SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEUR DETTES PUBLIQUES (1927).
156. See Garner, supra note 147, at 426-27. According to the Treaty of Versailles, cer-
tain parts of German territory were ceded to other states (such as France and Poland). Pursu-
ant to Articles 254 and 255, these states assumed liability for a portion of the German pre-war
debt as well as the public debt. In a similar situation under Article 203 of the Treaty of Saint
Germain (the Treaty of Peace with Austria), the pre-war debt of the Austrian-Hungarian
Monarchy was divided among succession states and the states that had acquired territory.
157. Garner, Germany's Responsibility for the Austrian Debt, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 766,
772 (1938).
158. Japan was the third country ever to secede from the League, while two others were
Costa Rica in 1927 and Brazil in 1928. Costa Rica and Brazil withdrew from the League as a
result of disagreements with certain general principles upon which the League was operating.
Meanwhile, the secession of Japan resulted from whether international and Covenantal obliga-
tions had been fulfilled.
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totalitarian "Axis." Japan wanted to gain freedom from the obliga-
tions of the Covenant. 159 This raised the following two issues: (1)
what was the reaction of the League as a result of Japan's notice of
withdrawal, and (2) whether a withdrawing state had to surrender
territories which it was controlling under the League's mandate sys-
tem. In notifying her intention to withdraw, Japan stated that not
only was the League's opinion in interpreting the Covenant and
other treaties diametrically opposed to it's thinking, but the League
also had failed to grasp the realities of the situation in the Far East;
in fact five months later the German government accused the
League of failing to realize the situation in disarmament. Neither
the Council nor the Assembly made any direct statement regarding
the fulfillment or violation of Japan's obligations and no interpreta-
tion of the withdrawal clause was attempted. °60 When Japan's two
year notice expired on March 27, 1935, the Secretary General of the
League and, the Japanese Consul General in Geneva exchanged
notes and declared that Japan no longer had any rights or obliga-
tions under the Covenant. Meanwhile, the Chinese representative ob-
jected to this communication on the grounds that the Secretary Gen-
eral had no such authority to receive the note subsequent to
withdrawal.'
The tactic to refrain from dealing with Japan's notice of seces-
sion might be explained by the Assembly's February 24, 1933 adop-
tion of a report on the Manchurian affair, that was damaging for the
Japanese side. This report, which was adopted under Article 15(10)
and read in conjunction with paragraph four, formed part of the dis-
pute settlement procedure under the Covenant: if arbitration, judi-
cial settlement, or the Council itself had failed in achieving an ami-
cable solution to the conflict,, the Assembly was given the power to
make and publish a report referring to the dispute's facts as well as
propose just recommendations. Part III of his report disclosed the
Assembly's opinion with respect to Japan's and China's fulfillment of
their duties under the Covenant. Although it was recognized that
they had legitimate grievances against each other in Manchuria
159. It is undisputed that Japan violated its obligations in the Sino-Japanese dispute of
September 1931 when it displayed a complete disregard for the traditional laws of warfare.
The dispute concerned the Mukden Incident. On September 18, 1931, Japan invaded and mili-
tarily occupied Manchuria. By March 9, 1932; the hold on the country was sufficient to justify
the setting up of the new "independent" state, Manchuco. Manchuco was formally recognized
by Japan on September 15, 1932, and lasted until Japan's defeat in 1945.
160. See Burns, supra note 6, at 47. See also Lauterpacht, Resort to War and the Inter-
pretation of the Covenant during the Manchurian Dispute, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 44 (1932).
161. China's argument was credible because the subject matter of the notes could only
have been decided by a resolution of the Assembly or of the Council; the entity of the Secreta-
riat comprising the office of the Secretary General was subordinate to these bodies, according
to Article 2 of the Covenant. See Wright, The Effect of Withdrawal from the League upon a
Mandate, 1935 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 104, 105 [hereinafter Effect].
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prior to September 18, 1931, both states were blamed for the Man-
churian affair. 6 ' Ultimately, China was cleared from any responsi-
bility, however, Japan was held to be in breach of Article 10 for not
respecting the territorial integrity and existing political independence
of a League member as well as in breach of Article 12 for not sub-
mitting the dispute to arbitration, judicial settlement, or to inquiry
by the Council.
Within one month after the adoption of this report, Japan noti-
fied her intention to secede the Assembly; concurred with by all
members of the Council, 6 ' They had already decided that Japan
had violated her Covenantal obligations. International obligations
have been assumed under the following international treaties:
A) The Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities"'
which was signed and ratified by both Japan and China. Ac-
cording to Article 1 the contracting Parties recognized "that
hostilities between them must not commence without a previous
and explicit warning in the form of either a declaration of war,
giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of
war" and that "the existence of a state of war must be notified
to the neutral Powers without delay and shall not be held to
affect them until after the receipt of a notification which may,
however, be given by telegraph."'" Professor Brownlie of Ox-
ford University has noted that at no time either Japan or China
declared war, broke off their diplomatic relations or requested
third states to observe neutrality;'
B) The Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto;167 and
C) The Convention on Treatment of Prisoners of War.'68
It is difficult to comprehend what political considerations re-
sulted in the members' decision not to enforce the provisions of Arti-
cle 1(3) in the Manchurian Affair when Japan engaged in military
action against China without first declaring war. One conclusion is
162. Japan tried to solve the difficulties by unacceptable military means - namely by
forcibly seizing, occupying, and separating a large part of Chinese territory and declaring it an
"independent" state.
163. According to Article 15(10) only a simple majority was required. The present re-
port was adopted unanimously except for the negative vote of Japan and Siam's abstention.
Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 15(10).
164. The Hague Convention III, Oct. 18, 1907, U.K.T.S. 8.
165. Id. at art. 2. See BIRKENHEAD, supra note 153, at 191-92.
166. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 386
(1963). The fact that China did not declare war is irrelevant. What is under examination is
whether Japan, as a withdrawing state, had fulfilled her international obligations.
167. The Hague Convention IV, October 18, 1907, 8 U.K.T.S. (1910); see ROBERTS
AND GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, 169 (2nd ed., 1989).
168. The Convention on Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1927, 37 U.K.T.S.
(1931). Although both China and Japan signed the Convention on September 1, 1935, they
never ratified it.
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that the League interpreted this paragraph to mean that secession
came automatically once the two years of the withdrawal notice had
lapsed. Japan's secession was a test case crystallizing not only that
the rule of law did not function well, but also that Article 1(3) was
no obstacle for a state to violate her obligations, and by subsequently
accusing the League, to withdraw graciously. Both Germany's deci-
sion to secede in 1933 and Italy's decision to secede in 1937 were
based on this unfortunate reality.
After March 27, 1935, the issue was whether Japan remained a
mandatory power. 1 The academic opinion was divided on whether
Japan would automatically cease to be a mandatory once she retired
entirely from the League.170 One view was that the legal status
would not be affected in the slightest degree and this would have
been true even if Japan had been evicted from the League as a viola-
tor of the Covenant under Article 16(4).171 The issue of whether a
country had violated its Covenantal obligations did not deal with the
issue of whether that country had breached its obligations as a
mandatory. 17  The Council probably had power to remove a
mandatory"' and designate a new one in the event that there was
clear evidence of a violation of duties prescribed under Article 22. 17
It was unclear whether its right to do so was because the mandatory
had violated other provisions of the Covenant. Furthermore, in inter-
preting Article 22, the wording of this article did not suggest that a
mandatory had to be a Member State since being an "advanced na-
169. At the end of World War I, a number of underdeveloped colonies and territories
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states that had previously governed them. The
League refused their natural law right of self-determination and decided that guardianship of
such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations. This principle was embodied in Article
22 of the Covenant, and tutelage was to be exercised by advanced nations that fulfilled the
criteria of adequate resources, experience and geographical position, as mandatories on behalf
of the League. The basic thesis in the area is Q. WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS (1930) [hereinafter MANDATES]. Upon the demise of the League the mandate system
was transmitted into the United Nations' trusteeship system under Chapters XII and XIII of
the United Nations Charter.
170. Japan's Type C mandate was the former German islands in the Pacific Ocean
north of the equator. The mandate was confirmed and its terms defined by a Declaration of the
Council made in Geneva on December 17, 1926, published in 1 HUDSON 47. See 1 OPPEN-
HEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW vol. I, at 220 (8th ed. 1955); Gregory, Mandate over Yap, 15 AM.
J. INT'L L. 419 (1921).
171. Evans, Would Japanese Withdrawal from the League Affect the Status of the Jap-
anese Mandate?, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 140, 142 (1933).
172. Wright, Some Legal Aspects of the Far Eastern Situation 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 509,
515 (1933).
173. Under Article 22, it was the Council's duty to oversee the mandate system. In
effect, this would have been the competent body and not the Assembly to disqualify a
mandatory. However, Article 22 was completely silent in this respect. Covenant, supra note
19, at art. 22.
174. Wright argued that the Council would probably refuse to act until such delin-
quency had been recognized by the PCIJ or another judicial authority. Effect, supra note 161,
at 109. As it has already been mentioned, Wright took the view that the PCIJ was the compe-
tent body to adjudicate on alleged violations of covenantal obligations. Id.
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tion" was sufficient. However, the Council's understanding was that
the mandatory had to be a Member State in order to submit man-
date disputes to the PCIJ.178 The opinion that it was the intention of
the drafters of Article 22 that the mandatory had to enjoy member-
ship in the League at the same time because otherwise it would have
been very difficulty to administer the system.
176
By virtue of Article 23(b) of the Covenant, the members of the
League undertook "to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants
of territories under their control." 17 7 How could a non-member be
bound by this provision, since it is a general principle of interna-
tional law that the legally binding effect of a treaty is only upon
signatory states (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt)? Of course, it
could be argued that nonparties may be bound in an indirect fashion
in the sense that they may, by their conduct, indicate their intention
to accept such provisions as general rules of international law and be
bound by the legal force that these rules enjoy."7
It was thought that, as a general rule, the mandatory power had
to take the initiative to terminate its mandate, but this rule was not
exclusive. Also, if the Council terminated the mandate the
mandatory's consent was required. This was deemed necessary be-
cause "otherwise the termination would be equivalent to an act of
deposition or to a unilateral decision incompatible with the decision
of the Principal Powers, which conferred the mandates and with the
acceptance by the Mandatories of the burdens and responsibilities of
the mandate."179 If the normal course was followed, a mandatory
175. This requirement was imposed by virtue of Article 7 of the 1926 Declaration. See
MANDATES, supra note 169, at 146.
176. Under Article 81 of the UN Charter, a nonmember state may be designated as an
administering authority. At its 316th Plenary Meeting, the General Assembly approved a trus-
teeship for Somalia to be administered by Italy, although at that time Italy was not a United
Nations member.
177. Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 23(b).
178. See STARK, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (1989). Stark furnishes as
an example the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf Cases, 1969 ICJ 3, where it held that Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf (Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311) had been subsequently accepted by West
Germany - a nonparty - in the necessary manifest manner. The problem is not quite solved
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 29, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 re-
printed in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (in force since January 276, 1980). The relevant Article 35
mentions only "treaties providing for obligations for third states." Covenant, supra note 19, at
art. 35.
179. Evidence is adduced from the wording of the second paragraph of this article:".
tutelage should be exercised as Mandatories on behalf of the League" and the eighth para-
graph: "The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory
shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in
each case by the Council." The issues that arose were: 1) how could the Covenant bind a
nonmember to exercise guardianship on behalf of the League; 2) could a mandatory nonmem-
ber have agreed upon the degree of authority, control or administration since this issue was to
be dealt with exclusively between League members; and 3) how could a state outside the
League participate in the Council in order to define in its particular case the degree of author-
ity, or administration? See Evans, The General Principles Governing the Termination of a
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would recommend such termination and would submit full evidence
in support of it to the Council, and then the Council would decide
whether the recommendation was justified; if so, it would draw up an
"act of termination" containing the conditions and guarantees to be
signed by the representatives of the new state.
After Japan's withdrawal in late March 1935, Japan recognized
her obligations under the mandate system, and it regularly observed
her duty under Article 22(7) of the Covenant to submit an annual
report and accredit a representative to appear during the discussion
of the reports before the Permanent Mandates Commission where a
Japanese official continued to serve as one of its members by virtue
of Article 22(9). The system worked until a Japanese official notified
the Mandates Commission that he was not taking part in its work of
the October 1938 session as a result of the League's decision in Sep-
tember 1938 to authorize sanctions against Japan for her involve-
ment in the Chinese hostilities. The action escalated on November 2,
1938, when Japan decided to discontinue cooperation with the or-
gans of the League.1" '
The legal issue that arose was whether Japan's failure to ac-
credit a representative was a breach of an international obligation.
The answer depended on whether Japan, who in 1920 as a Member
State of the League and of the Council, had agreed on this resolu-
tion and was still bound by it. This appeared to be the case since at
Japan's 1935 succession, she recognized the continuance of her obli-
gations under Article 22 in order to maintain legal power to adminis-
ter the Pacific Islands. Not all members of the Mandates Commis-
sion reached the same conclusion; some of them were influenced by
the fact that Japan did send the required report. Since the Commis-
sion could not reach a common stance on the legal issue, it turned to
examine the practical aspects of the problem and, finally, agreed
that it served no real purpose if Japan were to submit an annual
report and took no part in its examination. 1 '
Officially, Japan renounced all its rights, title, and claim in con-
nection with its mandate by virtue of Article 2(d) of the Peace
Treaty with the Allied Powers which was signed in San Francisco on
September 8, 1951. In its seating of April 2, 1947, the United Na-
tions Security Council extended the trusteeship system to the Pacific
Islands; 8 2 according to Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, Japan was
Mandate, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 735, 747 (1932).
180. See Wright, The Mandates in 1938, 33 Am. J. INT'L L. 342, 347-48 (1939).
181. Apparently, the report was practically identical year after year.
182. The Pacific Islands Trust Agreement was approved, according to which: "Japan, as
a result of the Second World War has ceased to exercise any authority on these islands." An
amendment to the Agreement to say that Japan, having violated the terms of her mandate,
"has thus forfeited her mandate" was endorsed by the United States. However, in the end the
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obliged to concur in any decision of the United Nations to appoint
the United States of America as the sole administering authority of
these islands.1 88
X. Withdrawal by not Ratifying Amendments to the Covenant
The Covenant envisaged another situation in which withdrawal
of a Member State from the League was permitted: Article 26(2)
stated that if a country dissented from an amendment made to the
Covenant and this dissent was made known, then this amendment
would not bind the Member State in question, but at the same time,
that state would cease to be a member. 84 Any amendment to the
Covenant had to obtain the unanimous approval of the permanent
and nonpermanent members of the Council; in effect, every single
state represented in the Council could have blocked any amendment
by exercising its veto against it. Article 26, as it appeared in the
Draft Agreement for a League of Nations presented to the Plenary
Inter-Allied Conference of February 14, 1919, was stricter because
it demanded that amendments were ratified by three-fourths of the
states whose representatives composed the Body of Delegates (later
it became the Assembly),'8" and there was no mention of the with-
drawal option. The latter was added at the request of the Brazilian
delegation in order to avoid certain difficulties that arose under its
Constitution"' and of the representatives of Switzerland and the
Netherlands who argued that the amendment provision would consti-
tute a limitation of the sovereignty of the small states. Since revision
of the Covenant was allowed by less than unanimous vote, the princi-
ple of consent by all signatories was preserved by the right to
secede."8 '
The Second Assembly during its October 1921 session tried to
amendment was dropped. See Hall, The Trusteeship System, 1947 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 33, 52.
Presently the Trusteeship Council is responsible for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Island.
See I. BRONWLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 567 (4th ed. 1990).
183. See KELSON, supra note 105, at 166.
184. The possibility of having the Covenant revised was regulated in the first paragraph
of Article 26. Although the procedure to amend the Covenant was not mentioned, it was stipu-
lated that any amendment would only become operative if all states that had a seat in the
Council ratified it and if the Assembly approved it by a simple majority. Note the principle
that no state will be bound by any new obligation to which it refuses its consent: ex consensu
advenit vinculum.
185. The three-fourths majority was retained for amendments to the Constitution of the
International Labor Organization (ILO). See art. 422 of the Versailles Treaty.
186. Note that in 1930, Brazil stated that she could not agree without parliamentary
authorization to the provision of the 1929 Revision Protocol to the Statute of the PCIJ Brazil
would enter into force provided that the Council of the League had satisfied itself that those
states that had not ratified it by the given date had no objection to the addition of the amend-
ments. By the end of 1935, although almost every Member State of the League had ratified
the Revision Protocol, Brazil was still seeking for the necessary approval by her legislature.
See HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 140 (1943).
187. See E. HOYT, THE UNANIMITY RULE IN THE REVISION OF TREATIES 53 (1959).
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amend the wording of this withdrawal clause by making it more
comprehensive; it proposed that Member States were allowed to
leave the League when they had not ratified the amendment and had
notified the Secretary General accordingly within one year of their
refusal to accept the revision." 8 The proposed amendment took the
form of a protocol which embodied the resolution of amendment as
noted by the Second Assembly and it remained open for signature
and ratification by the Member States. Since the required number of
ratifications were never achieved within the stipulated period of
twenty-two months after the vote of the Assembly, the wording of
Article 26 was never changed.
The innovative withdrawal clause enshrined in Article 26(2)
was not repeated in the Charter of the United Nations (UN). After
the Second World War, it appears that only in a small number of
treaties that set up international organizations included such a with-
drawal clause. One treaty was the Convention on the Grant of Euro-
pean Patents, under which established the European Patent Office,
refers to revision.1 89 It provides that for the Convention to be revised
a conference of the Contracting States must .be convened.. The con-
ference will decide how many states should ratify the amended text
in order to enter into force and those states that have not ratified it
at the time of its entry into force shall cease to be parties to the
Convention from that time.190 While Articles 175 and 176 of the
European Patents Convention dealt with the position of a former
contracting State vis-a-vis the organization, 91 Article 26(2) of the
Covenant made no mention in this respect. The issue whether a
League member had to fulfill all international and Covenantal obli-
gations in pursuance of Article 1(3) remained rather theoretical,
188. See Finch, Proposed Amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations, 16
AM. J. INT'L L. 263, 271 (1922).
189. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270 (1970).
In the territory of the European Economic Community, this Convention was given effect by
the Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975, 19 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 17) 1 (1976).
190. But see the Convention on the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May
12, 1954, art. 16(6), 327 U.N.T.S. 3. Article 16(6) provides that an amendment will come into
force for all Contracting Governments, except for those countries which make a declaration
that they do not accept the amendment before it comes into force. Such declaration, however,
does not have the effect of forcing the governments that made it to cease being parties to the
Convention. See Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field
of International Law, INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 146, 188 (1959).
Another means of securing ratification of amendments to a treaty is to omit those states
that can validly be expected not to ratify them from the list of those states whose ratification is
required before the amendments come into force. This happened in 1945 when an amendment
to the Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, 8 June 1937, 190 L.N.T.S. 79; 7 HUDSON
754, was opened for signature stipulating that the ratification of Ireland was not necessary.
See HOYT, supra note 187, at 43-44.
191. The former article guarantees the preservation of acquired rights, and the latter
refers to the financial rights and obligations.
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since no Member State had ever made use of this option.
A second relevant treaty is the 1944 Chicago Convention, which
founded the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 1"1
Although for a proposed amendment to come into force it is not nec-
essary that the whole membership ratifies such amendment, Article
94(b) grants to the ICAO Assembly the right to demand "that any
state which has not ratified within a specified period after the
amendment has come into force shall thereupon cease to be a mem-
ber of the Organization and a party to the Convention.""' The fact
that so far the Assembly has not used its powers under Article 94(b)
has led to the observation that "the Assembly will not invoke Article
94(b) unless the amendment in question involves a fundamental
change of the entire Convention scheme.
'194
A third treaty is the Pact of Arab States which set up the
League of Arab States. 195 According to Article 19, if the Charter is
amended by the required two-thirds majority, a dissenting Member
State has the right to withdraw without advance notice. This provi-
sion should be contrasted with the normal withdrawal clause that is
embodied in Article 18 of the Charter and which provides that a
member must inform the Council of its intention to secede one year
prior to withdrawal. Since the League's inception none of these two
withdrawal clauses has ever been invoked.1 96
XI. Withdrawal from the United Nations
It is often said that the League of Nations collapsed because of
the secession of so many of its Member States. By April 1942, seven-
teen States out of a total membership of sixty-three had exercised
their right to withdraw. When American technical experts were
working on detailed plans for a permanent international organization
in the winter of 1942-1943, they felt that the experience of the
League had indicated that the right of withdrawal weakened the au-
thority of an international institution, especially if membership were
to be global and automatic.'
192. Since 1947 the Chicago Convention has been amended eleven times; the 1977 and
1980 amendments have not yet entered into force because of lack of ratifications and it ap-
pears that some of the Contracting States have not ratified any of the amendments. Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation, Sept. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (signed in Chicago).
193. This was the situation as of June 1990. The first, the so-called Montreal Protocols
of 1977 (Misc. 12, 13 (1978)), amended the final paragraph of the Convention so as to allow
for an authentic Russian text and the second, the 1980 Protocol (Misc 2 (1980)), amended art.
83.
194. BURGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE ICAO 39 (1969).
195. Pact of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 237.
196. See Shihab, The League of Arab States, 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 21 (1984); Pogany, The League of Arab States: An Overview, 21 BRAC. L.J. 41
(1989).
197. See RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UN CHARTER 350 (1958).
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During the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks round of negotiations for the
creation of a United Nations Organization, the United States pro-
posed that no provision for withdrawal be included in the Charter.
The assumption was that Member States would normally remain
part of the Organization. It appears that this .proposal was accepted
by the other states participating in the negotiations. The United
States government interpreted its position as meaning that a sover-
eign state was not barred from withdrawing, but that this possibility
should be played down by omitting any reference to it.' 98 The British
position was similar: "States would have no right to withdrawal vol-
untarily; the intention is that membership of the Organization shall
be permanent."' 199
In early 1945 the question of secession surfaced during the San
Francisco Conference, the entity that adopted the United Nations
Charter in the summer of that year. A sub-committee was set up to
clarify the issue of membership and its conclusions were communi-
cated to Committee '/2. This committee dealt with questions of mem-
bership. The Chairman of the Committee said that the main conclu-
sion was that "the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals deliberately omitted
provisions for withdrawal in order to avoid the weakness of the
League Covenant" and that was accepted by the representatives of a
number of states at a later meeting of Committee .200
Whether withdrawal should be permitted and whether a with-
drawal clause should be inserted in the Charter was further dis-
cussed in a second sub-committee appointed on May 21, 1945, at
which all four Great Powers were represented. The sub-committee's
conclusions complicated things because it suggested there be a quali-
fied right of withdrawal in case the Organization proved was not
able to establish peace or to do so only through turmoil. It is submit-
ted that the sub-committee's opinion was a manifestation of the in-
ternational law doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. This doctrine, applied
to the present circumstances, meant that although a country joined
the United Nations with the understanding that her membership
would be eternal, if the United Nations itself failed to fulfill its role
and objectives, then that country should be given the option to with-
draw from it. Committee /2 decided that the Charter should be silent
on the question of secession. An interpretative declaration was
adopted, however, which read as follows:
If a Member because of exceptional circumstances feels re-
straint to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining inter-
198. Id. at 438.
199. See the British Commentary on Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment
of a General International Organization, Cm6571 (1944), at 6.
200. See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 197-198.
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national peace and security on the other Members, it is not the
purpose of the Organization to compel that Member to continue
its cooperation in the Organization.
2 0
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Committee also tackled the issue of a Member State should
be allowed to withdraw, if an amendment to the Charter was agreed
to by the majority of UN Members but the state was unable to ac-
cept the amendment. The Committee declared that should such a
case occur, it would not be "the purpose of the Organization to com-
pel a Member to remain in the Organization. "202 The Soviet delega-
tion criticized the interpretative declaration. It felt that the right of
withdrawal was a manifestation of state sovereignty, and therefore,
should be granted in the Charter itself.203
After the declaration of Committee had been accepted by the
San Francisco Conference, a number of participants commented
upon the question of secession.204 These participants agreed that the
right of withdrawal existed but it could not be exercised automati-
cally, as was the case with the League of Nations. Very good reasons
had to be shown before secession would be permissible. The opinion
of leading commentators of the day was the opposite, however, when
you look at the 1948 writing of Hans Kelsen, a leading authority on
the United Nations: "There can be little doubt that . . . a right of
withdrawal from the United Nations would require an express provi-
sion in the Charter.
20 8
The effectiveness of this declaration has only been tested once so
far. In January 1965 Indonesia formally notified the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations by letter that it "had decided at this
stage and under the present circumstances to withdraw from the
United Nations. 2 0 6 This move was the direct consequence-of Indo-
nesia's position in relation to Malaysia's seat in the Security Council.
Indonesia's President had promised the population that "if neo-colo-
nialist 'Malaysia' was seated in the Security Council" he would take
Indonesia out of the United Nations.207 The presence of Malaysia
was thought to be against the "lofty principles of the UN Charter"
201. Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organizations, 273
(Vol. 7, 1943).
202. Id.
203. For the Soviet position, see the report sent by A Gromyko, then Head of the Soviet
delegation, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on June 6, 1945. DIE KONFERENZ DEN VER-
EINTEN NATIONEN VON SAN FRANSISCO, VERLAG PROGRESS/STAATSVERLAG DER DEUTSCHEN
DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIC 426 (1988).
204. For an account of these statements, see Feinberg, supra note 187, at 200-201;
TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 349-50 (1974).
205. Kelsen, Withdrawal from the UN, W. POL'Y Q. 29, 43 (1949).
206. Unni, Indonesia's Withdrawal from the UN, IND. J. INT'L L. 128 (1965) [hereinaf-
ter Unnil; Schwelb, Withdrawal from the UN, the Indonesian Intermezzo, 61 AM. J. INT'L L.
661 (1967); Blum, Indonesian's return to the UN, INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 522 (1967).
207. Unni, supra note 206, at 128.
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and made "a mockery of this function and purpose of the UN Secur-
ity Council."
A month later the Secretary General acknowledged receipt of
the letter of withdrawal. Although stating that the incident had
given rise to a situation for which no express provision was made in
the Charter, the Secretary General arranged for the secession to be
effective as of March 1, 1965.208 The reaction of Member States was
diverse: Great Britain felt that the reason given was insufficient to
warrant withdrawal, whereas Italy regarded the incident as an excel-
lent opportunity for putting forward a strong case of regulating se-
cession from the United Nations formally.
20 9
From its weak action it appears that the UN Secretariat ac-
cepted that secession was possible even though some UN members
still regarded Indonesia as a Member State.2 10 The incident ended in
September 1966 when the Indonesian Ambassador communicated to
the Secretary General the decision of his government to "resume full
co-operation with the United Nations and to resume participation in
its activities starting with the twenty first [1967] session of the Gen-
eral Assembly. 211 The wording of the communication offered the
President of the General Assembly leeway to state in its 1420th ple-
nary session that Indonesia's action constituted only an absence from
the Organization based on cessation of cooperation and not upon a
withdrawal from the United Nations but upon cessation of coopera-
tion. There were no objections to this statement and Indonesia was
allowed to return to the United Nations and its specialized agencies
even though she had withdrawn without having to be readmitted. In
theory, because Indonesia's membership had continued uninter-
rupted during the eighteen months of "non-participation" she had to
pay a token contribution of ten percent of the monies she would have
been assessed in the UN budget.
XII. Epilogue
The League of Nations was a novel experience in international
relations. It served the international community well in the period
between the two World Wars and set the fundamentals of contempo-
rary international law. The League's activities were not only political
in nature but the League was also engaged in social and humanita-
208. See Matters Pertaining to Indonesia's Membership in the UN, 1964 U.N.Y.B.
1989-92.
209. See 1964 U.N.Y.B. 191; 1965 U.N.Y.B. 237.
210. During 1965 Malaysia lodged several complaints to the Security Council alleging
aggressive acts by Indonesia and a military build up along the Borneo border. See 1965
U.N.Y.B. 194.




rian activities. Its efforts in the fields of health, international labor
legislation and refugee settlement set the pace for the intensification
of international cooperation.
It is often quoted that the League failed in its main aim, which
was to maintain international peace and order because it did not pre-
vent the outbreak of war in September 1939; that- was the direct
consequence of the fact that it lacked "teeth," in other words, it
lacked the necessary means of enforcing its will on its Member
States. But these are rather political considerations that fail to take
into account the fact that the creation and working of the League
have altered pre-existing doctrine on almost every question of public
international law. It is true that the massive secession from the
League contributed to the subsequent destruction, but this was the
price that had to be paid for granting to its members an unrestrained
right of withdrawal.
In our era, the two most important international organizations,
namely the United Nations and the European Economic Commu-
nity, deprive their members of their sovereign right to choose seces-
sion, thus, to avoid a troublesome relationship within these organiza-
tions. It is submitted that in the question of secession the approach
taken by the League of Nations was the correct one, but unfortu-
nately it was abused by a number of states which put their narrow
nationalistic interests over and above those interests to which they
had subscribed when they first joined the League.
LEAGUE

